US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
10-1-2015

Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military
Presence in the Middle East
W. Andrew Terrill Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
W. Andrew Terrill Dr., Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military Presence in the Middle
East ( US Army War College Press, 2015),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/439

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

UNITED STATES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

Carlisle Barracks, PA

ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
W. Andrew Terrill

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

and

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP and
DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
contributes to the education of world class senior
leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides
solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.

U.S. Army War College

SLDR

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

W. Andrew Terrill

October 2015
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

v

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-706-5

vi

FOREWORD
The Middle East is currently in one of its most dramatic periods of turbulence since the post-World War
I emergence of the modern state system in that region.
Recently, the United States and its Arab allies have
been concerned by a number of distressing regional
trends including the uncertain future of Iranian influence throughout the region, the rise and persistence
of the Islamic State (IS) organization, the ouster of Yemen’s Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi government from
the capital of Sana’a and that country’s subsequent
civil war, and the rise of insurgencies in Libya, Egypt,
and especially the Sinai.
The intense unrest in the Middle East has created
new conflicts, but it has also brought some of the regional status quo powers into a greater level of cooperation to help address these problems. Saudi Arabia
has emerged as a significant regional leader, almost by
default, as other important Arab states such as Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, and Libya have been struggling with
domestic crises. Since the ouster of Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood government in July 2013, Riyadh and
Cairo have maintained what often appears to be an
important and stable working relationship. Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf countries have provided billions in aid to the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi government in
Egypt, and Riyadh and Cairo have discussed dramatically increased military cooperation.
The Arab states aligned with the United States
currently are facing a number of particularly serious
regional policy problems and remains an incubator
of radicalism and terrorism. The Syrian civil war currently presents few scenarios for a decent outcome
and continues to consume massive numbers of lives.
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Iraq is also deeply troubled, with large portions of its
northern territories including the city of Mosul still
controlled by the IS organization. Other problem areas include Yemen and Libya, where dramatic domestic upheaval is continuing. In Egypt, President Sisi’s
iron fist approach to a Sinai-based domestic insurgency has been unsuccessful in defeating the terrorists or
containing the conflict, which is growing. Finally, the
Iranian nuclear agreement between that country and
a number of major powers led by the United States
has generated considerable unease among some Arab
countries fearful of an Iran no longer constrained by
sanctions.
Under these circumstances, the serious and mutating problems facing both the United States and
the conservative Arab states are likely to cause both
friction and cooperation between allies. The Saudis and other Gulf Arab oil producers also fear that
new sources of global energy and more efficient usage of that energy have made them less important to
the United States. As these problems become more
complex, Arab allies are also aware that for now they
have few other options for great power support beyond the United States. Russia has provided support
to the hated Assad regime in the Syrian civil war and
has little influence in the region except with Syria and
Iran. Beijing’s clout in the region tends to be financial rather than military, and China does not currently
have military forces in place to defend the Gulf Arab
states from Iran even if it wanted to do so. While
China is deeply interested in increasing its maritime
capabilities, serious military power projection into the
Gulf region seems a distant prospect.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national se-

viii

curity debate on this important subject as our nation
continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East. This analysis
should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders,
policy analysts, and intelligence professionals as they
seek to address the complicated interplay of factors
related to regional security issues, fighting terrorism,
and the support of local allies. This work may also
benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long
range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It
is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of
all services as well as other U.S. Government officials
involved in military and security assistance planning.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The threat perceptions of many Arab states aligned
with the United States have changed significantly as a
result of such dramatic events as the 2011 U.S. military
withdrawal from Iraq, the emergence and then fading
of the Arab Spring, the rise of Iranian power and Tehran’s nuclear agreement with key world powers, the
Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, and the
development of civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and
Libya. A particularly worrisome development and
expansion has been the dramatic rise of the “Islamic
State” (IS) organization which has seized considerable
tracts of territory in Iraq and Syria and inspired terrorists throughout the region. Elsewhere in the region,
the 2013 election of the pragmatic and statesmanlike
Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is viewed by some
Arab states as a potential opportunity but also a danger since the new Iranian government has a potentially shrewder and more effective president and cabinet
than seen during the Ahmadinejad years. There have
also been some notable differences that have developed between the United States and its Arab allies
over how to address these issues and most especially
Iranian regional ambitions.
Some Arab leaders, including a number of Saudis
and other Gulf Arabs, have subtly but publicly criticized the United States for appearing to lose interest in
the Middle East as it becomes less dependent on that
region’s energy and due to serious problems encountered with the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Many
Arab states are also concerned that the United States
may become increasingly interested in disengaging
from the problems of the Arab World at a time when
increased U.S. attention may be required to address
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the discord over the South China Sea and emerging
problems in Eastern Europe and particularly Ukraine.
To these Arab states, other regions are something of a
distraction and they see any increased U.S. attention
on Asia or Eastern Europe as a potential long-term national security problem. Moreover, while the rise of
the Islamic State (IS) organization has refocused U.S.
attention on the Middle East, most conservative Arab
states remain concerned about retaining a sustained
U.S. commitment to the region and are worried that
Washington and Tehran are in considerable agreement over the danger posed by IS, even as they are
distrustful of each other.
U.S. efforts to prepare for conflicts in the Middle
East consequently remain vital, and doing so through
actions which deter such conflicts is an especially optimal outcome. Shaping the Middle East strategic environment through carefully tailored collaboration with
Arab partner nations presents one of the best ways to
both prepare for a potential conflict and to deter that
conflict through U.S. and allied defense preparedness.
In this environment, it is important that Washington
has an array of options that can be used to support
and reassure local allies and deter aggression so that
the threat of war can be averted before it is realized.
The United States continues to project its interest in
the region through a number of ways examined in
this work including multilateral exercises such as Eager Lion in Jordan, regionally aligned forces, military
forward presence, and military advice and assistance.
Even with increased energy independence, the United States maintains a number of core interests in the
Middle East and is often drawn back to the emerging
problems and crises there. In parallel, the conservative Arab states are aware that they have no good
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alternative to the United States as their most important security partner at the present time. A variety
of U.S. officials are committed to a strong effort to
convince Arab allies that the United States will not
abandon them or downgrade the importance of their
security concerns.
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ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Introduction: Protecting U.S. Interests in the Arab
World in a Time of Global Change.
The Middle Eastern strategic environment has
been especially dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11 U.S. combat operations in Iraq,
the Arab Spring uprisings and attempted uprisings,
the rise of Iranian power, the Egyptian revolution and
counterrevolution, the Syrian civil war, the emergence
of the Islamic State organization in Syria and Iraq, the
danger of al-Qaeda affiliates in various countries including Syria and Yemen, and the continuing rise in
sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number
of regional countries, including some enveloped in
civil war. All of these developments are of deep interest to Middle Eastern regional powers and to extra-regional powers that are involved in the Middle
East including the United States. This monograph is
focused on the conservative Arab states aligned with
the United States, especially Egypt, Jordan, and the
Gulf monarchies. It does not address Arab-Israeli relations which have been comprehensively discussed
elsewhere.1 Additionally, some major Arab states such
as Egypt and especially Iraq are currently so focused
on domestic turmoil that they can direct only limited
attention to foreign policy issues that do not impact
them in a direct, short term way. These states sporadically assert themselves on a variety of some key issues.
In the midst of changing Middle East developments, the stability of the Arab world remains of critical importance to the United States, despite strategic
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challenges in other parts of the world. Numerous U.S.
presidents have emphasized their country’s commitment to Middle Eastern defense and enumerated the
U.S. interests in the region that need to be protected.2
In a recent example, President Barack Obama has
stated that U.S. “core interests” in the Middle East
include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies exported
to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction, and (4) the defense of Israel and
advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process.3 Other
recent and contemporary U.S. political and military
leaders have elaborated on the President’s views by
noting the Middle East will remain vital to Washington even as the United States moves closer to energy
independence.4
Obama’s comments indicate that U.S. interests in
the Middle East have become more complex in the last
few decades and can no longer be reduced to the traditional goals of access to energy products at reasonable
prices and support for Israel, although these concerns
remain important. In this regard, new oil and gas discoveries within the United States, new technologies
for energy extraction, and progress with alternative
energy sources have made the United States significantly less dependent on Middle Eastern energy over
the last 5 years.5 Nevertheless, U.S. energy interests
extend beyond the country’s own imports. Serious
conflict in the region can disrupt global energy markets and therefore hurt the U.S. economy. Moreover,
a number of U.S. allies in Western Europe and Asia
are nowhere near energy independence and will need
continuing access to Gulf energy resources for the
foreseeable future.
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More strategically, the United States garners significant global influence by using its diplomatic and
military clout to guarantee freedom of navigation for
the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf energy
supplies.6 All states importing or exporting energy
products from the Gulf consequently maintain an interest in U.S. policy toward the region. If the United
States relinquished this position, a strategic vacuum
would be created. Other powers, such as China or
eventually even a resurgent Russia, under some circumstances may become interested in expanding their
roles in the region, although they will not be able to
replace the United States in any reasonable short- or
medium-term scenario.7 In recent years, China has
expanded its diplomatic and commercial presence in
the Middle East and especially commercial relations
with Saudi Arabia, although it currently maintains
only a limited military presence in the Gulf.8 Moreover, at this time, Beijing is basing most of its growing
blue water navy in Asian waters. It is doubtful China
would expend significant resources to seek a major
role as a Gulf military power, while facing geopolitical
concerns and territorial disputes in the Pacific Ocean
region.9 Chinese military ambitions in the Middle East
would also alarm India which has increased its naval
budget in response to previous expansions of Chinese
naval activity.10 Additionally, most Arab states would
prefer to retain the United States as the guarantor of
Gulf Arab security if this option remains open. These
nations do not consider Russia or China to be their
natural allies and are concerned about Russian and
Chinese ties to Iran and Moscow’s strong support for
Syria’s Bashar Hafez al-Assad regime.
In recent years, the U.S. leadership has put forward the strategy of a rebalancing of its military forces
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to meet needs in Asia, essentially to reassure U.S. and
Asian allies that they will not be abandoned in the
face of rising Chinese military power.11 This strategy
seems to have declined in urgency as new U.S. security concerns have escalated in countries such as Iraq
and Syria. Nevertheless, the level of discord between
China and some other Asian states has intensified
over disagreements on issues such as island sovereignty and the establishment of the Chinese air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China
Sea on November 23, 2013. U.S. allies (such as Japan
and the Philippines) and even neutrals (such as Vietnam) in Asia have sought to consolidate and improve
their ties with Washington as they have become increasingly concerned about China. While the planned
intensification of U.S. focus on Asia has been limited
by serious problems in the Middle East including
the rise of the Islamic State (IS) organization in Syria
and Iraq, it could easily re-emerge in response to a
deepening crisis there.
The legacy of U.S. participation in the Iraq War
(2003-11) is an important factor in the internal U.S. debate on Middle Eastern military policy since that conflict has generated increased public and policymaker
aversion to the use of military force (and especially
ground forces) to fight major wars and then engage in
long occupations, nation-building efforts, and counterinsurgencies. The United States lost almost 4,500
troops in the Iraq War, with a much larger number of
wounded. The direct costs of the conflict were $804 billion from 2003 to 2011.12 These negative consequences
were not widely foreseen prior to the invasion, and
the George W. Bush administration initially suggested
the war would be quick, one-sided, and would not
require a lengthy occupation with a large number of
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troops.13 Unrealistic expectations of rapid and easy
victory in Iraq in 2003 have sometimes made it much
more difficult for contemporary policymakers to gain
public support for even the limited use of force to address international concerns where there is a fear of
expanding and deepening involvement in an ongoing
conflict (often referred to as “mission creep”).14
While still in office, former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates stated:
In my opinion, any future defense secretary who
advises the President to again send a big American
land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa
should have his head examined, as General MacArthur so delicately put it.15

Obama has never been this blunt, but he consistently
indicates that he will seek to avoid using massive conventional military force except in cases involving a
U.S. national survival interest. 16 In his 2014 State of
the Union address, Obama stated:
I will not send our troops into harm’s way unless it is
truly necessary, nor will I allow our sons and daughters to be mired in open-ended conflict. We must
fight the battles that need to be fought, not those that
terrorists prefer from us—large scale deployments
that drain our strength and may ultimately feed
extremism.17

These concerns are clearly reflected in the administration’s efforts to address the IS threat without the use
of U.S. ground units in direct combat so long as this is
possible.
A planned summer 2013 limited attack on Syria
with air strikes and cruise missiles to deter the Assad
government from the future use of chemical weapons
5

faced furious opposition from domestic critics and
public opinion.18 Likewise, Obama’s decision to use
air strikes against IS and deploy U.S. military advisors and technical specialists to Iraq over the course of
2014 faced some public doubt, although these actions
were less controversial than the potential strike on
Syria, and significant elements of the U.S. public were
willing to support air strikes against IS radicals. Support for U.S. military action in Syria and Iraq escalated
dramatically when IS began beheading U.S. and other
hostages, with these events displayed on the Internet.
In a surprising turnaround, significant elements of the
public briefly expressed a willingness to use ground
troops as part of the war against IS in the immediate
aftermath of these events.19
The need for U.S.-led military intervention to stop
IS expansion illustrates that understanding the dangers of future military interventions does not allow
one to reach the conclusion that military actions and
activities are no longer required to defend U.S. vital
interests in the Middle East. In the future, other potential U.S. military actions in the Middle East may
be widely recognized by the public as truly necessary.
Some challenges to U.S. interests may not be viewed
as immediate threats to national survival, but the
long-term consequences of leaving these problems
unaddressed are likely to involve factors relating to
both U.S. global leadership and the U.S. economic
future. If vital U.S. interests are strongly threatened
in the future, large segments of the U.S. public may
consider future military actions involving the defense
of these interests to be “wars of necessity.” Such interventions may still be required regardless of how conscientiously the U.S. leadership struggles to prevent
such eventualities from playing themselves out.
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The U.S. interests previously noted will need to be
protected. Many Arab states (particularly in the Gulf)
have important natural resources and a great deal of
infrastructure wealth, and are correspondingly concerned about their limited capacity for self-defense.
Gulf leaders also consider their countries vulnerable
to military pressure or even attacks by larger neighbors as well as insurgencies along the lines of recent
problems in Yemen and Iraq.20 To deal with either
type of contingency, friendly states will need limited
but tangible allied support. Such strategies will need
to be developed and refined to continue serving the interests already identified by Obama and his predecessors, in collaboration with regional allies. The United
States will also have to make serious efforts to work
through the problems with regional allies which have
occurred in recent years and to find ways to reassure
those allies about continuing U.S. interests in this vital
region. In order to reduce the impact of these differences, Washington will need to understand regional
threat perceptions regarding Iran, the Assad regime in
Syria, IS, al-Qaeda affiliates, and other dangers.
Regional Threat Perceptions and the
Syrian Civil War.
The Syrian civil war is an important national security concern for a variety of regional states. Saudi
Arabia and Qatar were especially interested in shaping the outcome of the war and provided significant
supplies of arms to non-IS, anti-Assad rebels. While
the Saudis and many of their allies made the ouster of
the Assad regime their initial priority for Syria, not all
Arab nations felt this concern with the same degree
of urgency. Iraq, under former Prime Minister Nouri
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al-Maliki’s government, maintained a relatively proAssad foreign policy after 2011 to the extent it could do
so without provoking a crisis with the United States.21
The Lebanese government initially attempted to maintain its neutrality in the conflict as a strategy for avoiding being drawn decisively into the bloodshed, but it
now seems to view the IS and the al-Qaeda affiliated
al-Nusra Front as more serious threats to Lebanese security than Assad. Lebanese authorities have already
dealt with some Syrian-related violence in their country and fear a process of future escalation leading to
another round of Lebanese civil war.22 Egypt, while
aligned with Saudi Arabia on most issues, has a much
softer position on Syria. The Egyptians are opposed to
Assad remaining in power but also stress that Assad’s
non-Islamist government will have to be part of a negotiated solution.23 This viewpoint reflects Cairo’s intense distrust of the Islamist rebel groups and in some
ways parallels concerns expressed by U.S. leaders.
Kuwait also called for a political solution to the crisis
and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states may
become more openly supportive of this solution over
time in the face of mounting problems with IS.24
Many conservative Arab leaders, and especially
those from Sunni monarchical regimes, have always
disliked Syria’s Alawite-led revolutionary “republic”
under the Assads. This animus has become magnified
as the Syrian death toll in the war mounted, and as the
Saudis increasingly came to believe that the struggle in
Syria has become a proxy war between their country
and Iran, which is a strong Assad ally. Saudi Arabia
and other conservative Arab states have also been distressed by U.S. policy toward the Syrian civil war. Early in the conflict, Saudi leaders argued that the United
States had not done enough to help the rebels fighting
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against the Assad regime, and they argued for more
lethal aid to moderate rebels and perhaps a no fly zone
to halt the bombing activities of the Syrian Air Force.25
The United States has been hesitant to insert itself into
a central role in the Syrian civil war, although it has
provided moderate groups with limited amounts of
lethal aid and much larger amounts of nonlethal aid.
In recent years, Washington has been concerned that
the moderate elements within the Syrian opposition
(except for Kurdish fighters) are not very viable and
may either collaborate or in some cases expand existing collaboration with more radical groups or simply
have their weapons taken from them by these groups,
as has occurred in the past.26 U.S. policymakers were
particularly disturbed when TOW (tube-launched,
optically tracked, wire-guided) anti-tank weapons
provided to moderate rebels in 2014 came into the possession of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front, after
they had either co-opted or defeated the groups that
had originally received these weapons.27 This situation
changed when IS activities in Syria, and especially Iraq,
became more threatening to larger regional interests,
and the United States assembled a coalition of states to
oppose IS. The most immediate result of this effort was
the initiation of a U.S.-led bombing campaign against
IS forces in Iraq and then Syria, and an effort to support the rebuilding of the Iraqi army, which will be
discussed later.
A number of conservative Arab states were also
critical of the U.S. decision in the summer of 2013 to
stand down from a planned air and cruise missile
attack on Syrian regime targets as punishment for
Syrian use of chemical weapons against unarmed civilians in a suburb of Damascus.28 The Saudis were
particularly angry that the United States cancelled the
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strike against Syria in favor of a Russian-sponsored
diplomatic solution to the problem of Syrian chemical
weapons use. The clash of goals in this instance occurred because Washington was primarily concerned
about enforcing the taboo against chemical weapons
use in war and was not looking for an excuse to alter
the balance of military power in Syria. Secretary of
State John Kerry underscored the limited nature of the
plan when he stated:
We will be able to hold Bashar al-Assad accountable
without engaging in troops on the ground or any other
prolonged kind of effort in a very limited, very targeted, short-term effort that degrades his capacity to
deliver chemical weapons without assuming responsibility for Syria’s civil war.

He then added that the strikes would be an “unbelievably small, limited kind of effort.”29 Additionally,
it now appears that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister
Yuval Steinitz, under instructions from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, informed the United States
that his country favored a solution that could eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons, which were originally developed and designed to use against them.30
These weapons would have remained a threat to Israel if the regime retained them, but might emerge
as an even greater threat if they were seized by terrorists. Consequently, Israel favored the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons stocks rather than a
punishment raid.
Another way that Saudi Arabia has expressed its
unhappiness with the U.S. approach to the conflict is
through its policies involving potential spillover from
the Syrian civil war.31 Riyadh has agreed to provide
the Lebanese Army $3 billion to purchase weapons
10

primarily from France and thereby strengthening the
Lebanese capacity to maintain its internal security
while possibly weakening the position of the pro-Iranian militia, Hezbollah.32 The agreement also includes
training programs for the Lebanese Army conducted
by the French military.33 Weapons deliveries, under
this agreement, began in April 2015 and are expected
to continue over the next 4 years.34 The aid package favors the purchase of French weapons and equipment,
a provision that may have been included to express
Saudi dissatisfaction with Washington’s policies on
Iran and Syria.35 Paris also maintained a clear hard
line on Iranian nuclear weapons issues throughout the
negotiations in Switzerland, which was reassuring to
Riyadh.36 Lebanon, for its part, has an extremely serious need for modern weapons to cope with spillover
(including jihadist incitement and infiltration) from
the Syrian civil war.
Over time, problems in Syria began to appear more
far-reaching and complex. In the 2013-15 time frame,
many Arab countries became increasingly concerned
about IS actions and success throughout the Levant,
while continuing to express their unwillingness to
tolerate the continuation of the Assad regime.37 Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also
increasingly alarmed about domestic implications of
this organization’s success in Syria and Iraq and have
dramatically strengthened their counterterrorism
laws, especially the penalties for joining or supporting terrorist organizations such as the IS.38 The UAE
has even enacted a toleration law criminalizing insults
against other religious sects and ethnicities or any act
deemed to incite racial or religious hatred.39 Saudi and
Emirati anxiety about such issues can be placed into
perspective when one considers the large numbers of
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foreign fighters entering Syria at this time. According
to The Washington Post, up to 1,000 foreign fighters a
month were entering Syria in late-2014, with about
16,000 already in place.40 The national breakdown of
this group is unclear, and it is not certain how many
of them are joining IS, rather than other radical groups
such as al-Nusra Front.
Following the summer 2014 disaster in Iraq, a variety of Sunni Arab countries were willing to join the international coalition organized by the United States to
use airpower to fight IS in Syria and Iraq. Among the
Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, and Bahrain
sent aircraft to participate in the air campaign, while
Qatar provided ground support for the Arab portion
of the air campaign.41 Units of these air forces conducted a limited number of bombing missions against
both Iraqi and Syrian targets. Such actions were useful
to the United States beyond their military value since
the participation of these Sunni states in the coalition
helps dispel any notion that Washington was unilaterally siding with Shi’ite-led regimes in Iraq and Syria
against Sunni insurgents in a sectarian war. The Sunni
Arab regimes are also almost certainly interested in
participating in the coalition in order to have their
views remain relevant for any future decisions regarding U.S. and regional policies for Iraq and Syria,
especially in any final settlements of the conflicts.
Also in September 2014, the administration announced plans to help train and equip units of the Syrian moderate opposition, although this action was significantly less important than the bombing campaign.
The program was expected to involve only around
5,000 Syrians at a time, who were to be trained and
equipped for defensive warfare.42 As of mid-2015, the
U.S. portion of the training program for these troops
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had made almost no progress because of Syrian rebel
desertions and a painfully slow vetting process for
prospective participants.43 Should such problems
continue, it is doubtful that these fighters can become
even a minor force in Syria where more powerful
entities, including the Assad regime, al-Nusra Front,
and especially IS, currently dominate the struggle for
power. Despite such problems, various GCC states
sometimes still assert that the anti-IS struggle cannot lead to a relaxation of pressure on Assad or a de
facto alliance with his regime. These countries often
maintain the tyranny of the Assad regime is directly
responsible for the rise of radical groups including IS
and al-Nusra. They maintain that defeating IS, while
not addressing the reason it rose to prominence in the
first place, is a self-defeating strategy.44 This position
sounds logical, but it also has problems since there are
no good alternatives to these entities, and opposing
both of them equally may not be realistic.
The United States, while continuing to stress that
Assad has lost all legitimacy and must leave the country, calls for a negotiated political transition in Syria.
The negotiated solution envisioned by U.S. leaders involves the current Syrian government (without Assad
himself) but does not include IS or al-Nusra.45 The
Egyptian government, which detests Islamic radicals,
is also interested in a political solution to the war that
provides some major role for secular leaders while
freezing out radical jihadists. Jordan, which was deeply anti-Assad in the first years of the civil war, now appears to have decided that IS is the bigger threat. This
change has caused the Jordanians to disengage from
some of the anti-Assad forces they previously supported and explore the possibility of working more
intensively with tribal forces that are fighting IS rather
than the Syrian government.46
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As noted earlier, the Iranian role in the Syrian civil
war is quite important and is a source of ongoing frustration to the conservative Arab states. Iran provides
the Assad regime with financial support, military
advisors, weapons, and diplomatic support. Iran’s alQuds Force (an elite force of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps or IRGC) has been especially active in
training pro-Assad Syrian militias and providing the
regime with significant military advice and technical
assistance. Tehran has also strongly encouraged the
deployment of thousands of Hezbollah militiamen
from Lebanon to provide auxiliary infantry to the
Assad regime. Iran remains strongly committed to
Assad and can be expected to continue supporting his
regime despite the economic sanctions that Tehran is
currently enduring. In Nouri al-Maliki’s last years as
Iraq’s prime minister, his government also sided with
Assad in the unfolding civil war, although it did so
in a more low profile way. Iranian-supported Iraqi
Shi’ite militiamen have also participated in the conflict on the government’s side, although virtually all of
these forces are believed to have returned to Iraq after
June 2014 in response to the crisis created by IS seizure
of much of northern Iraq.47
The Saudis believed that the intense Iranian involvement in the Syrian conflict required a strong
response. In the early years of the conflict, then head
of intelligence, Prince Bandar pushed a very aggressive attempt to topple Assad by arming and supplying Syrian rebels.48 Critics maintain that this effort
included directing funds and transferring weapons
to the more effective rebel fighting units with insufficient regard for the danger of radical ideology. The
Saudis have responded that they have not supported
or funded militant jihadists “of any kind.”49 The sin-
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cerity of these remarks is difficult to gauge, but Saudi
Arabia has experienced a serious outbreak of al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorism within its own borders in the
2003-06 time frame. Saudi leaders seem to understand
that, in an interconnected age, terrorist ideas cannot
be confined within the borders of any one state. The
Saudis are particularly concerned about the potential
radicalization of portions of their youth and have imposed severe penalties for any person joining a radical organization. Saudis who join IS or another radical
organization will not be able to safely return to their
home countries without the fear of lengthy imprisonment or even the death penalty.
Even with Iranian help, the Syrian regime appears
to be losing ground to IS and other radical guerrilla
groups, while moderate Syrian fighters appear to have
been completely overshadowed by the radicals. Antijihadist Kurdish fighters have fought well but there
are limits to their geographic reach. The Syrian regime
will probably be able to maintain control of territory
in the Alawite areas and Damascus and survive in
some form. Conversely, it is increasingly doubtful
that the regime will recapture territory lost to IS in the
north in the foreseeable future, and over time Assad
may look more like a regional warlord than a national
leader. Two major offensives in early-2015 collapsed
in an indication of the staying power of IS and other
rebel groups.50
Problems of the Islamic State and Long-Term
Warfare in Iraq.
Although the conservative Arab states had a number of reasons to fear Saddam Hussein in the early1990s prior to Operation DESERT STORM, he was
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widely viewed as less dangerous by the early-2000s
due to his 1991 defeat and post-war sanctions. In
the aftermath of the 1958 revolution against Iraq’s
Hashemite king, many of the remaining Sunni Arab
monarchies viewed the safest and least revolutionary
form of Iraqi government to have been a Sunni strongman who was able to suppress revolutionary activity
among Iraq’s Shi’ites. The conservative Arab states
were never ideologically committed to democracy,
and some of them were deeply uneasy about the U.S.
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 to install a democracy
that they expected to empower the Shi’ite majority.
The rise of a Shi’ite dominated government in Baghdad was correspondingly alarming to Sunni-led states
such as Saudi Arabia and UAE. Jordan and pre-civil
war Syria also faced a huge influx of Iraqi refugees.
Sunni Arab concerns escalated following the U.S.
military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, when the Maliki government dramatically increased its aggressive
sectarian behavior.51 The Gulf press and various human rights organizations also suggest that Iraqi forces
make frequent use of torture and the death penalty
against Sunnis.52 Most significantly for Iraq’s future,
Maliki arrested a number of important figures within Iraq’s Sunni political establishment following the
U.S. withdrawal, thereby eliminating key leaders of
the Sunni community while intimidating the others.
Eventually, Maliki sidelined most of Iraq’s important
Sunni political leaders and consolidated a special relationship with Iran to the enduring contempt of most
Sunni Arab countries.53 The repression, corruption,
and sectarian basis of the Maliki regime provided a
perfect incubator for the revitalization of the insurgency. Maliki refused to accept responsibility for these
problems and claimed that jihadist activity in Iraq
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was solely the result of spillover from the Syrian civil
war. Later, in a reflection of the poisonous regional
atmosphere, he blamed Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the
UAE for “supporting terrorism” in Iraq.54 This charge
appears mostly unfounded, although some weapons
supplied to Syrian rebel groups could have changed
hands and ended up in Iraq.
In Iraq, IS’s initial effort to capture key urban centers was directed at the Sunni cities of Anbar Province.55 IS (then known as Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant [ISIL] or ISIS) then electrified the world with
its northern offensive, which gave the organization
its greatest victory. All four Iraqi army divisions stationed in the north collapsed rapidly when faced with
jihadist assaults, and IS seized Iraq’s second largest
city, Mosul.56 The militants then claimed to be planning to seize Baghdad, although this threat was never
credible. At the time, IS had only 3,000-5,000 fighters
in Iraq (with about the same number of allied auxiliary forces), while Baghdad is a city of over 7 million
people, the majority of whom are hostile Shi’ites with
their own militias.57 Moreover, the Shi’ite religious
leadership, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
called for Shi’ite militias to defend Baghdad as well
as the Shi’ite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. In displays of the most vulgar kind of raw sectarianism, IS
calls Karbala “the filth-ridden city” and Najaf “the city
of polytheism.”58 IS has also asserted that, once it had
seized these cities, it would destroy their Shi’ite religious sites, which are among the most important of
such shrines anywhere. In contrast to the Iraqi army,
many of the Shi’ite militia were willing to fight to the
last man to protect their holy sites.
Following the June 2014 rout of Iraqi security
forces, IS declared an Islamic caliphate in the area
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that it controlled, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
organization’s leader since April 2010, was declared
“caliph” and the “leader of Muslims everywhere.”59
To underscore this claim, the organization began using the name Islamic State for the first time, replacing
the name ISIL/ISIS and reflecting the organization’s
enhanced ambitions beyond Syria and Iraq. This statement claimed that IS was now the only legitimate
authority in the Muslim world and that its authority
superseded and replaced the leadership of each Muslim country. It also seems natural for the leaders of a
self-styled Islamic caliphate to be extremely interested
in seizing control of Islam’s holiest cities of Mecca,
Medina, and Jerusalem. Since Saudi Arabia controls
the two most important of these cities, it would seem
a natural target. Even with all of these warning signs,
most of the Gulf monarchies continued to view Iran
as their deadliest enemy in the immediate aftermath
of the seizure of Mosul.60 During the 2015 battle to
recapture Tikrit from IS, the Iranian role in assisting
Iraqi government forces was particularly worrisome
to many Arab leaders. The IRGC provided artillery
and rocket support to the Iraqi forces and may have
participated in the assault against strong points within the city although U.S. air support eventually was
called upon to break the back of IS resistance.61 Former
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal stated that Iran
had attempted to use its role in proving military aid to
Iraq as a way of “taking over” that country.62
As noted, most Gulf Arabs leaders, and especially the Saudis, detested former Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki throughout much of his time in office.
While most Sunni Arab states were delighted to see
him removed from power, many have continued to
view the Iraqi government with suspicion. Iraqi Prime
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Minister Haider al-Abadi seems to have earned some
respect from Sunni Arab leaders by his apparently
genuine efforts to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis, but many
other Iraqi government leaders still view Iraq’s Sunnis
as enemies.63 Highly sectarian Shi’ite cabinet members
and other hardline government leaders have demonstrated considerable resourcefulness in preventing
Abadi from implementing key reforms by establishing themselves as major power brokers.64 In one particularly alarming example, they have been highly effective at limiting Iraqi government military aid for
anti-IS Sunni tribes that the United States would like
to supply with weapons to defend themselves against
IS forces.65 Instead, they strongly favored Shi’ite militias. Also, Iranian military aid to the Shi’ite militias
is not new, but quickly increased and became more
overt since the June 2014 defeats. Abadi has denied
undue Iranian influence over his country, claiming
that relations with Tehran are “very balanced” with
ties with other important regional countries.66
In this difficult and uncertain environment, some
Sunni Arab states have made an effort to improve relations with Iraq’s post-Maliki government, despite
their ongoing concerns about Iranian influence and
the excessive sectarianism of some Iraqi cabinet members. In this spirit, the Saudi leadership has announced
that it will reopen its embassy in Baghdad and open a
consulate in Erbil (the capital of the Kurdish Regional
Government) as soon as security conditions permit.67
The Saudis had previously appointed an ambassador in 2009 but based him in Jordan, claiming that
Baghdad was too dangerous for a permanent diplomatic presence. Diplomats from various countries had
previously been kidnapped or killed in Iraq for several years after the removal of the Saddam Hussein
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regime, although this has not occurred in recent years
except in territory overrun by IS forces.
Many leaders throughout the region increasingly
view the future of Iraq as volatile with considerable
potential for developments there to harm their own
security for years to come. Sisi has stated, “[IS has] a
plan to take over Egypt” which they hoped to implement after seizing Iraq, Syria, and then Jordan and
Saudi Arabia.68 States neighboring both Syria and Iraq
are deeply concerned that IS-controlled areas could
become a center of terrorist training, operational planning, and propaganda against their regimes. Additionally, Jordan and Lebanon have been swamped by
large numbers of refugees from Syria and to a lesser
extent Iraq. Jordan became especially concerned that
the fall of Palmyra in Syria, around 150 miles from
the Jordanian border, would increase the number of
refugees flowing into the kingdom and would also
escalate the risk of jihadist infiltration.69
Even prior to the rise of IS, Saudi Arabia has faced
serious problems with terrorism including a dramatic
bombing and terrorism campaign conducted by alQaeda within the Saudi Arabian homeland from 2003
to 2006. Since that time, a number of terrorist organizations have attempted to work with radical Saudis to
strike against the government. Many of these people
have been arrested in periodic sweeps, including individuals accused of receiving training from radical
forces abroad, coordination with foreign terrorists,
accumulating explosives or large numbers of weapons, harboring wanted individuals, and other such
activities.70
Currently, IS also appears to be operating an uncertain number of cells in the Gulf monarchies. Saudi
Arabia arrested a suspected IS operative in Riyadh in
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April 2015 as a suspect in the murder of two policemen. The suspect told police that he was an IS member
and had received weapons, money, and instructions
from his IS handlers.71 In a more sweeping event at
approximately the same time, Saudi officials arrested
93 people suspected of being IS members living and
operating within Saudi Arabia. These arrests included
at least 65 Saudi nationals as well as a number of foreigners within the Kingdom. Additionally, one cell
that was swept up in the operation was reported to
be planning a suicide car bombing against the U.S.
embassy in Riyadh.72 More arrests would come later
as important portions of the network progressively
unraveled in the face of Saudi police work.
The problem also acquired a new dimension beginning in November 2014 when some extremely militant Sunni Saudi Arabians attacked a Shi’ite village in
the Eastern Province’s village of al-Dalwah, killing at
least 8 people. IS did not claim responsibility for the
strike and there are no indications of operational coordination with the attackers, but many of them had
been previously jailed for jihadist activities including
fighting in Syria.73 The Saudi authorities moved quickly to arrest the suspects in the murders, clearly hoping to prevent the development of a cycle of terrorism
and response. More recently, the previously unknown
“Najd Province of the Islamic State” claimed several
major Gulf attacks, which were also designed to sow
sectarian discord.74 The most serious of these attacks
against a target in Saudi Arabia occurred in lateMay 2015, when a suicide bomber attacked a Shi’ite
mosque in al-Qadeeh village that killed 21 people
and wounded nearly 100 others.75 The group openly
acknowledged that it was attempting to provoke a
sectarian confrontation to help facilitate the fall of the
Saud family.76
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In addition to Saudi Arabia, the Najd Province
has also struck in Kuwait. In a particularly horrific
episode, a suicide bomber arriving from Saudi Arabia
walked into the historic Imam Sadiq Mosque and blew
himself up, killing 27 Shi’ite worshipers and wounding a staggering 227.77 While the terrorist was clearly
provided with the bomb and other forms of support
inside of Kuwait, his handlers apparently believed
that his identity as a foreigner would help to protect
the Najd Province network inside of Kuwait. This belief seems to have been a mistake as Kuwaiti security
forces moved intensively and aggressively to identify
IS militants in their country. The Kuwaitis arrested at
least 29 suspects, including 11 expected to be charged
with murder for their roles in the mosque attack. The
Kuwaiti government is expected to seek the death penalty in the trials of these individuals.78 Some suspects
were also released after they were questioned, and the
authorities were satisfied that they were not involved.
Many Arab states are deeply concerned about the
implications of IS sectarian terrorism, hatred, and incitement to violence within their home countries, especially in countries with significant numbers of Shi’ites
including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. These
countries may be particularly vulnerable should IS be
able to incite extremist Sunni citizens to attack Shi’ite
neighbors and thereby fan the flames of sectarianism
to a degree that will be difficult to extinguish. Suspicious and sometimes hostile attitudes toward Shi’ites
have existed in these societies long before IS became
a factor and have generally increased as a result of increased sectarianism throughout the Middle East following the rise of a Shi’ite-dominated government in
Iraq, but it is also true that both IS and al-Qaeda seek to
make the situation worse and that IS propaganda iden-
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tifies Shi’ites as heretics who have little, if any, right to
even live.79
The technical and marketing effectiveness of IS
propaganda is another important capability unmatched by earlier terrorist groups targeting the Gulf
monarchies. While Saudi counterterrorism capabilities have improved dramatically over the past decade,
Riyadh may now be facing a much more effective enemy than al-Qaeda in the field of propaganda warfare.
Moreover, by seizing large areas of territory in Syria
and Iraq and declaring a caliphate, IS also appears
more successful than other terrorist organizations and
correspondingly can emphasize major achievements.
In response to the radical message, the Saudi leadership continues to emphasize the theme of IS and alQaeda as brutal, renegade groups that have nothing to
do with true Islam, regardless of what they say. Saudi
Arabia’s leading cleric, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul
Aziz al-Sheikh, has stated that ISIS and al-Qaeda jihadists are “enemy number one” of Islam and that their
calls for jihad were issued on “perverted” grounds.80
There is also the question of IS infiltration into
countries bordering Iraq and Syria. This danger is especially troubling for Saudi Arabia, which has a long
border with Iraq. So far, only a very limited number
of terrorist infiltration efforts have occurred from Iraq,
although at least one of these was especially bloody.
In this instance, in early-2015 four heavily armed men
from Iraq attacked a Saudi border patrol force with
suicide vests and automatic weapons. While all of
these attackers were killed, three Saudi soldiers also
lost their lives.81 The Saudi Interior Ministry later announced that the attackers belonged to a “deviant
group,” a phrase that usually indicates al-Qaeda but
would also seem applicable to IS.82 In this difficult en-
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vironment, Saudi Arabia is currently building a 900
kilometer security fence along its border with Iraq to
help manage the problem of infiltration.83 Jordan and
Kuwait also have borders with Iraq, but they are much
shorter and easier to monitor. The Kuwaitis, in particular, have also spent decades improving their border
defenses with Iraq to the point that a serious infiltration danger probably no longer exists.84 Additionally,
unlike Jordan and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has a long
border with Yemen that needs to be protected. This
problem became especially clear on August 6, 2015,
when an IS terrorist wearing a suicide vest walked
into a mosque frequented by the security forces in the
southwestern city of Abha, near the Yemeni border,
and managed to kill 15 people after detonating his explosives.85 The terrorist, who was Saudi, is widely suspected of having infiltrated from across the Yemeni
border, although this possibility remains unproven.
U.S. Arab Relations and the Challenge of Iran.
A number of Arab allies including Egypt, Jordan,
and especially the GCC states have viewed the potential rise of Iran to nuclear weapons state status as
a major national security issue.86 This scenario may
be averted for at least 10 years by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement arrived
at by the United Nations (UN) Permanent 5 plus 1
(P5+1) negotiators, but serious concerns remain. In
particular, the agreement does not and was never
meant to help resolve non-nuclear regional issues.
Thus, many differences remain unresolved. As noted
earlier, most Gulf Arab states have experienced longstanding problems in their political relations with
Tehran which have been aggravated by the rise of the
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Iranian strategic threat following Iraq’s collapse into
chaos and Tehran’s intense involvement in Syria, Iraq,
Yemen, and elsewhere.
The Arab world correspondingly has a mixed but
generally unfavorable response to the announcement
in July 2015 that the United States and its partners had
worked out an agreement on Iranian nuclear weapons
and sanctions relief. The Iraqi leadership viewed the
agreement with a sense of relief since that country’s
two primary supporters now appear less hostile to
each other.87 Oman, which is the only GCC state that
maintains good relations with Iran, also approves of
the agreement.88 The leadership of Abu Dhabi in the
UAE was deeply concerned about the agreement, although the leadership of the emirate of Dubai (also
within the UAE) sees strong economic potential in the
lifting of Iranian sanctions. Unsurprisingly, within the
Arab world, the country most upset with the agreement is clearly Saudi Arabia. The Saudis appear less
concerned with the technical aspects of the agreement
than the potential for the United States to improve its
relations with Iran, and the prospect of an economically stronger Iran due to sanctions relief.89 Most other
Gulf States are generally concerned as well, although
they have not chosen to confront the United States
publicly over the issue.
Many of the problems between Iran and various
Arab states have been building for some time. In his
book, Duty, Gates recounts his 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting there with King Abdullah. This
came at a time when public hostility between Iran
and Saudi Arabia was less obvious, and Tehran and
Riyadh did not yet have their current virulent disagreements over issues such as the Syrian civil war,
the Saudi-led military intervention in support of Bah-
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rain’s monarchy, and years later the bombing of Yemen. Nevertheless, according to Gates, “[Abdullah]
wanted a full-scale military attack on Iranian military
targets, not just nuclear sites.”90 As these discussions
progressed, Gates did not react well to the king’s assertiveness, and he characterized Abdullah’s comments as treating the U.S. military as “mercenaries.”
He further described the meeting by stating:
The longer he talked, the angrier I got, and I responded quite undiplomatically. I told him that absent an
Iranian military attack on U.S. forces or our allies, if
the president [Bush] launched another preventive war
in the Middle East, he would likely be impeached; that
we had our hands full in Iraq; and the president would
use force only to protect vital American interests.91

Gates also told King Abdullah that showing restraint
was a sign of strength and not a sign of weakness
as the king maintained. Four years later, in another
meeting, King Abdullah graciously thanked Gates
for his candor, although he might have preferred a
different reaction.92
The cold war between Iran and some of the Gulf
Arab states deepened significantly following the
March 2011 Saudi-led GCC military intervention
into Bahrain to support their monarchy and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which began in the same
month.93 Prior to the GCC move into Bahrain, the Iranians publicly supported the demands of Bahrain’s
mostly Shi’ite demonstrators, who called for a greater
public role in the governance of the Sunni-led monarchy. These demonstrators were inspired by early
days of the Arab Spring in which the governments of
several other Arab countries already had been overthrown. The Manama government feared ouster and
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requested military and police support from its GCC
partners. Saudi Arabia and the UAE agreed to provide
the majority of forces for this intervention and met the
Bahraini request. Tehran subsequently was infuriated
by these actions which propped up an anti-Iranian
monarchy just as it was being challenged by largescale protests with at least some pro-Iranian elements
among the protestors. Although the GCC intervention
forces never actually fought against the demonstrators, their presence was highly significant in signaling wider support for Bahrain’s government. Their
deployment to protect key infrastructure and installations may also have freed Bahraini forces from some
more routine duties so that they could more forcefully (and harshly) move against the demonstrators.
Additionally, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in
the same month as the intervention in Bahrain further
intensified Gulf Arab-Iranian tensions. The Saudi decision to intervene in Yemen, which will be discussed
later, further damaged Iranian-Saudi relations. In the
July 2015 Jerusalem Day demonstrations in Tehran,
the House of Saud was unexpectedly denounced by
protestors, in addition to the usual targets of Israel
and the United States.94
Adding to the deterioration of Arab-Iranian relations at this sensitive time, some older antagonisms
were further inflamed when a series of senior Iranian
officials visited the disputed islands of Abu Musa and
the Tunbs in 2012 and 2013 as a way of underscoring their physical control over them.95 Then President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the islands in April
2013 very late into his presidency.96 The islands, originally seized by Iran in 1971, are also claimed by the
UAE. UAE claims are strongly backed by the Arab
League.97 Tensions over these very small islands re-
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main a central factor in complicating Iranian-UAE relations for mostly symbolic and national pride-related
reasons, although they have some strategic significance as well due to their proximity to the Straits of
Hormuz. Ahmadinejad seemed to enjoy antagonizing
the Gulf Arabs for no clear foreign policy reason and
in sharp contrast to the measured approach of his successor. Unsurprisingly, the depth of fear and distrust
in the UAE for the Islamic regime in Tehran is sometimes no less than in Riyadh, although as a smaller
country, it is more cautious about openly confronting
Iran.98
In contrast to their fears about an eventual Iranian
nuclear weapons capability, most Arab nations are
not deeply concerned about Iran’s conventional forces, which are large but also have significant shortcomings. In this regard, a great deal of Iranian conventional military equipment is older and has been severely
worn by overuse. While the Iranian military should
be able to function effectively as a defensive force,
these units would have serious problems projecting
offensive power by crossing large tracks of hostile terrain.99 Tehran’s ability to project conventional military
power across the Gulf is also limited by Iran’s need
to circumvent or neutralize U.S., British, French, and
Gulf Arab naval forces stationed there. Iran’s ability to
provide effective logistical support to its forces in hostile territory is especially doubtful, even with countries which can be reached without crossing the Gulf
(such as Iraq or Kuwait through Iraq).
The conditions of Iranian forces will almost certainly improve if the UN conventional arms embargo
is lifted in 2020 as envisioned in the JCPOA generated
by the Iranian nuclear negotiations, but even then
considerable money, time, and effort will be needed
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to modernize Iranian forces. Iran has not had access to
significant supplies of Western weapons since the fall
of the Shah in 1979, and Iran has been under an effective UN arms embargo since 2010. This embargo effectively has blocked Iran from receiving conventional
weapons from its most important post-1979 suppliers,
including Russia and China.100 Consequently, Tehran
has been forced to rely extensively on its domestic
arms industry, which is incapable of fully compensating for Tehran’s inability to import modern weapons.
The Russians have already indicated a strong desire
to go forward with such sales and will probably push
for the early lifting of the embargo to the extent that
they can make any progress on this issue.101 When the
embargo is lifted, Iran can be expected to purchase
systems such as the S-300 air defense missiles fairly
rapidly, but it is unclear how quickly they will attempt
to modernize their ground and air forces.
A more serious concern for many of the Arab states
involves Iran’s unconventional forces. Although Tehran’s conventional military forces have major shortcomings, Iran has a strong capacity for waging asymmetric warfare with its naval and elite ground forces.
Facets of this approach include the use of irregular
forces and proxy forces, as well as covert arms transfers and providing training to such groups within
a target country. One of Iran’s most useful tools in
projecting this kind of power is the IRGC’s al-Quds
Force. The al-Quds Force has a long record of working with pro-Iranian revolutionary groups in a variety
of countries including Iraq and Afghanistan.102 In both
of these instances, they are also known to have supplied highly effective improvised explosive devices
to anti-American forces.103 In Syria, the al-Quds Force
maintains an important role in supporting the Assad
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regime. While the al-Quds Force is not known to be
playing a direct combat role in the war, its trainers and
advisors have been invaluable in helping the government remain in power. The al-Quds Force willingness
to help Assad is also underscored by the loss of five
al-Quds Force generals in Syria in separate incidents
since the beginning of the civil war. One of these generals was targeted and assassinated, while the others
may have simply gotten too close to the fighting.104 In
Iraq, the al-Quds Force has played at least an equally
important role as in Syria, training and supporting
pro-government Shi’ite militias.105
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and some other
Arab states are uneasy about the possibility that Tehran might be able to normalize its relations with the
West at a time when many Arab-Iranian problems
are unresolved. These states are also concerned that
the United States may become increasingly interested
in a “grand bargain” on IS and other regional issues
with Iran as a way of de-escalating tensions with Iran
at a time when increased U.S. attention is required in
the South China Sea and Eastern Europe (especially
the Ukraine) and when both Washington and Tehran
are struggling against IS in Iraq.106 In the past, many
Arab states have been especially concerned about
a U.S.-Iranian understanding, which resolves most
of U.S.-Iranian differences and potentially leads the
United States to take a much more sympathetic view
of Iranian foreign policy.107 Some Arab allies are also
concerned that the United States might give too much
away in a deal with Iran or begin to view Iran as a potential partner on some issues in Iraq and elsewhere.
These states may also be unhappy over the United
Kingdom’s (UK) decision to re-establish diplomatic
relations with Iran at the charge d’affaires level.108 The
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UK is Washington’s closest ally, and its actions could
easily be viewed as paving the way for a similar
U.S. action.
A number of Arab leaders are also uncertain about
the international implications of the leadership of Hassan Rowhani, the pragmatic Iranian president elected
in 2013. Iran’s former President Ahmadinejad could
always be counted upon to make extreme statements
that would infuriate and mortify the West, ensuring
that little to no progress could occur in improving
Iranian relations with the United States and Europe.
Rowhani is nothing like his undiplomatic predecessor
and openly called for reconciliation with the Gulf Arabs upon taking office. Later, after the announcement
of the opening of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1,
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited a
number of Gulf States including Kuwait, Oman, the
UAE, and Qatar but not Saudi Arabia or Bahrain.109 He
travelled to these states to indicate an interest in better
relations and assure these countries that the nuclear
deal with the P5+1 would not be at their expense. Zarif has also indicated an interest in resolving the islands
dispute with the UAE in sharp contrast to the rhetoric and symbolism of the previous government.110 He
expressed interest in visiting Saudi Arabia to discuss
sustentative matters “when they’re ready” and made
a short mostly symbolic visit to Riyadh to pay Iranian
respects after the death of King Abdullah in January
2015.111 Unfortunately for Iranian moderates, Rowhani’s restraint is not always matched by that of Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who often
favors extremely harsh rhetoric.
While the prospect of any kind of breakthrough
in U.S.-Iranian relations beyond the 2015 JCPOA is
always worrisome to conservative Arab states, such
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an occurrence at this time may be particularly alarming with the GCC-Iranian cold war further escalating over Yemen (discussed later). If U.S. attention
is more focused on Asia and Eastern Europe, there
is concern that the United States may not wish to
confront Iran. Some Arab leaders are worried that
the United States has negotiated a less than optimal
nuclear agreement with Iran.112 Washington has also
made an effort to insulate the nuclear talks from other
issues, clearly indicating a belief that expanding the
number of issues will over-complicate the talks and
dramatically reduce already limited chances for success. This approach has not been agreeable to all U.S.
allies. Saudi Arabia and Israel consistently have argued that any final deal over Iranian nuclear issues
should also address regional issues, including Iran’s
role in Syria.113 Conversely, Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Abbas Araghchi told an Iranian State Television interviewer that a nuclear deal would not mean
a normalization of ties with the United States.114 This
sentiment was echoed in a more authoritative way
by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei after the
conclusion of the JCPOA.115
Some Arab states are also uneasy that both the
United States and Iran have made efforts to prop up
the Baghdad government and worry that this common
goal could lead to a wider relationship. They point to
the fact that Washington has at least temporarily limited its criticism of significant, overt Iranian involvement in Iraqi defense and suggested that under some
circumstances this involvement may yield positive results.116 When asked about the possibility of increased
cooperation with Washington on security matters as a
result of the crisis, President Hassan Rowhani stated,
“If we see that the United States takes action against
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terrorist groups in Iraq, then one can think about it.”117
The Gulf Arabs are often uneasy about any discussion
of an expanded U.S.-Iranian relationship. Kerry has
responded to this unease by noting that, at this point,
the United States and Iran have a mutual interest but
not a cooperative effort in Iraq. Obama has stated that
he does not expect a “formal set of agreements” on
U.S. and Iranian activities in Iraq but said U.S. officials
would do their best to “de-conflict efforts by the U.S.
and Iranian forces in that country.”118
Saudi Arabia’s leaders have also indicated that, if
Iran ever acquires and deploys a nuclear weapon, they
might be compelled to try to do the same thing and
at this time, at least, reach the same level of nuclear
infrastructure capability as Iran is granted under the
JCPOA.119 Such statements may be genuine, or they
may be mostly bluster and anger. In the early-1970s,
many within the Arab world clearly believed reports
that Israel had acquired nuclear weapons, but they did
not seek to match that capability. For Saudi Arabia to
seek to acquire nuclear weapons in contemporary times
would involve a series of political difficulties with the
United States, Europe, other Arab states, and Israel.
Building its own nuclear infrastructure encompassing
the full nuclear fuel cycle and weapons cycle would be
a difficult and lengthy project for a nonindustrialized
nation such as Saudi Arabia.120 Suggestions that Saudi
Arabia might purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan also seem far-fetched, since Pakistan would reap
a variety of international repercussions from such actions. Additionally, the Pakistanis do not seem to have
much difficulty refusing Saudi Arabian requests, including Riyadh’s call for their participation in the air
war against Houthi rebels in Yemen.121
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Interestingly, on the basis of limited information,
it also appears that Saudi citizens (like their leadership) consider Iran to be their more dangerous enemy.
According to a public opinion poll conducted by the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzilya, Israel, 53 percent of Saudis identified Iran as their country’s main adversary,
22 percent said the Islamic State, and 18 percent said
Israel. Even more unexpectedly, a quarter of the respondents maintained that Saudi Arabia should work
together with Israel against Iran. The questioners told
respondents that they were conducting the survey for
the International Data Corporation, but did not further identify the center or associate it with Israel.122
While the Saudi government is seldom led by public
opinion, they also seem to be becoming more open to
Israeli contacts. At a 2015 conference in Washington,
Saudi Arabian and Israeli participants admitted that
representatives of their countries had held a series of
meetings on regional security issues.123 It is possible
these ties will grow in response to the strenuous objections both countries have about the July 2015 P5+1
agreement with Iran. Jordan and Egypt, which have
diplomatic relations with Israel, may also be expanding their relations with the Israelis.124
The Role of Egypt and Libya in Middle
Eastern Security.
The United States and many Arab states experienced some friction over policy differences involving
Egypt as far back as the ouster of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak in 2011. As the Mubarak government teetered, U.S. leadership had a choice of either
maintaining its support for the Egyptian president or
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switching its backing to the demonstrators challenging him. This was not an easy decision and required
a careful balancing of national objectives and values.
Mubarak had been a longtime ally and a strong supporter of the 1979 Egyptian peace treaty with Israel
and the struggle against Islamist terrorist groups such
as al-Qaeda. Conversely, the demonstrators were
clearly calling for democracy and expected U.S. support for their efforts to overthrow a friendly, but nevertheless highly autocratic regime. U.S. leadership
avoided strongly committing to either side in the early
stages of the conflict and did not start to tilt toward
the demonstrators until after a major Mubarak speech
on February 1, 2011, where he offered few meaningful concessions.125 U.S. policy toward the confrontation correspondingly satisfied virtually no one in the
region. Young activists challenging the regime later
expressed disappointment and strongly asserted that
the United States waited until the Mubarak regime
appeared doomed before switching its allegiance (a
critique which probably went too far).126 In contrast,
Arab conservatives, and especially the Gulf monarchies, were quick to charge that U.S. leaders abandoned Mubarak despite his many years as an ally.127
Gulf Arab leaders observing this process may have
been particularly concerned that the United States
would abandon them at some point for ideological
reasons if their monarchical governments were ever
challenged by a strong opposition demanding democracy or democratic reform.
Unexpectedly, the Mubarak regime (which had
been in power for almost 30 years) proved remarkably
fragile in the face of determined demonstrations and
calls for its removal. Egypt’s army, which had a long
history of involvement in domestic politics, initially

35

attempted to present itself as neutral and waited to see
if Mubarak could de-escalate the crisis with promises
of future concessions. Beginning on February 3, 2011,
the military began to move toward an accommodation
with the demonstrators as Mubarak proved increasingly incapable of pacifying or dispersing the crowd.
On February 10, the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF) issued a communique endorsing the
“people’s legitimate demands,” effectively removing
Mubarak from office.128 The next day the military assumed a caretaker governance of the country.
The Egyptian military assumed authority in the
immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, but its
most senior leaders and especially the elderly Defense
Minister, Field Marshal Mohammad Tantawi, did not
seem interested in ruling the country for a prolonged
period of time so long as they were able to maintain
the military’s privileged place in society. The Muslim
Brotherhood then rapidly emerged as a leading political player, although it suffered an especially serious
setback when the Egyptian Supreme Court dissolved
a friendly parliament on June 14, 2012. The Brotherhood then strongly rebounded when its candidate
Mohammad Morsi won a mid-June run-off election
with 51.7 percent of the vote.129 This outcome is less
impressive than it might initially seem, since Morsi
was only able to gain approximately half the votes in
an election against retired Air Force General Ahmad
Shafiq, an important figure in the Mubarak regime.130
In this election, only a little over half of eligible Egyptian voters participated, while the rest did not vote.
Adding to Brotherhood concerns, the SCAF issued a
decree severely limiting the powers of the presidency
shortly before the election results were announced.131
The SCAF based this proclamation on its status as
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the interim governing authority following Mubarak’s
ouster. Morsi took office as Egypt’s president on June
30, 2012.
The Morsi Administration lasted for just over a
year in power. This time frame was characterized by
considerable political infighting and no clear progress
in addressing Egypt’s towering economic problems.
On July 3, 2013, following several days of massive
popular demonstrations against the government, the
Egyptian military unilaterally dissolved Morsi’s government and placed him under arrest for a wide variety of crimes.132 Defense Minister General Sisi (who
had replaced Tantawi) emerged as the most important
figure in the ouster, although military leaders installed
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitution Court
as a figurehead president, pending new elections. In
March 2014, Sisi resigned from the military to run for
president. After winning the election, he assumed office in June. Morsi, by contrast, was sentenced to 20
years in prison in April 2015 after being convicted of
inciting violence and directing illegal detentions and
torture.133 In May 2015, he was further sentenced to
death, although it remains uncertain if this decision
will ever be carried out.134
The United States was again caught in a difficult
situation by the military’s 2013 seizure of power from
the incompetent although democratically elected Morsi government. Washington sought to continue good
relations with Cairo, and the administration refused to
label the ouster a coup. If U.S. leaders had done so officially, they would have been legally required to halt
aid to Egypt, which they wanted to avoid.135 Yet, while
seeking to work with the Egyptians, Washington was
also disturbed by substantial anti-democratic repression and ongoing excesses of the new government.
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The Egyptian government designated the Muslim
Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization following
a suicide car bombing of a police headquarters that
killed 15 people. The government never provided any
evidence of the Brotherhood’s involvement in the attack, although Sisi is openly determined to eradicate
the Muslim Brotherhood.136 He has also been prepared to accept a great deal of criticism over Egyptian
human rights policies to do so.137
The actions of the Egyptian military in ousting
Morsi were applauded by a number of conservative
Arab states. As Sisi moved against the Brotherhood,
he was strongly backed with financial support from
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.138 These wealthy countries
sought to protect Sisi from potential U.S. pressure and
provided the Egyptian leadership with political support for whatever harsh measures the Egyptian leadership considered necessary. In the aftermath of the
military seizing power, there was considerable street
unrest and bloodshed. Thousands of supporters of the
Muslim Brotherhood and others were killed in street
fighting with the police and army, often when government forces attempted to enforce a highly restrictive law regulating demonstrations. Huge numbers
of both Islamist and secular dissidents were also arrested. The administration of justice appeared deeply
flawed with some closed military trials for civilians
and occasional mass sentencing on the basis of “trials”
that lasted less than an hour and did not always allow
defense attorneys to speak.139 By April 2015, around
2,500 people had been killed in street violence, and
more than 40,000 were incarcerated for anti-regime or
pro-Islamist activities.140 In line with the example of
some other Arab states (such as the UAE), the Egyptian government has also moved to consolidate official
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control of the mosques by replacing pro-Brotherhood
clergy with licensed state approved clerics, who can
be trusted to give sermons adhering to strict government guidelines.141
In July 2013, the United States downgraded its military relations with Egypt as the result of the Egyptian
military seizing power and the ongoing crackdown on
dissents that followed this action. Prior to this disruption, the United States had provided $1.3 billion in aid
to Egypt, the balance of which was military aid. This
aid was scaled down in 2013 when delivery of high
profile items including F-16 aircraft, M-1 tanks, and
AH-64D Apache helicopters was suspended. These
measures were adopted reluctantly due to Egypt’s
high value as a regional partner, and they began to be
scaled back after less than a year. Correspondingly,
on April 22, 2014, the United States announced that it
would resume delivery of Apache helicopters to Egypt,
citing that country’s continuing commitment to the
peace treaty with Israel.142 The United States further
released $650 million in other military aid to Egypt at
the same time. These helicopters can be exceptionally
helpful in the counterinsurgency operations, and there
was a corresponding U.S. interest in transferring these
items. Later, in April 2015, the United States lifted all
remaining sanctions against the Egyptian military and
restored the full military aid relationship. As a result
of this change, the White House noted that the United
States would be sending additional fighter jets, missiles and tank kits to Egypt, and that it would continue to provide $1.3 billion in military assistance for
Egypt.143 The U.S. leadership also has indicated that it
hopes to shift Egyptian military aid away from tanks
and fighter aircraft toward weapons and equipment
designed to enhance counterterrorism capabilities
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and border and maritime security.144 Egypt, however,
has used air strikes against IS-affiliated forces in both
Libya and the Sinai, and Egyptian leadership does not
always seem to view counterinsurgency and conventional warfare in fundamentally different ways.
A major reason for the U.S. shift in military assistance policy involves the expansion of a serious Islamist insurgency centered in the Sinai Peninsula since
Morsi’s ouster. There have been a number of lawless
elements in the Sinai for decades, but the collapse of
the Mubarak government led to the withdrawal of a
number of policemen from the area and opportunities
for various groups to expand into a more formidable
threat.145 Currently, the militants are a mix of hardcore
Egyptian Islamic extremists, radical Palestinians from
nearby Gaza, foreign fighters, and disgruntled young
Egyptian men who are angry about their poverty and
lack of opportunities, according to Sinai residents.146
Some convicts who escaped from prison during the
uprising against Mubarak also joined the militants
in Sinai.
The al-Qaeda group formerly known as Ansar
Beit al Maqdis is the best known of the Sinai insurgent groups. In November 2014, the militants of this
group abandoned their relationship with al-Qaeda
and pledged loyalty to the IS caliphate, changing their
name to the “Sinai Province of the Islamic State.” This
group apparently pledged loyalty to the IS in the hope
that the group could give them money, weapons,
tactical advice, and propaganda support that might
help in recruiting.147 It is not certain how much of this
kind of support they received, although the group
has increased their holdings of sophisticated weapons through smuggling enabled by the disarray of
the Libyan civil war and the availability of weapons
once under the control of the Libyan military.148 In this
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environment, hundreds of Egyptian soldiers and policemen have died since July 3, 2013, many in attacks
by Muslim militants in Sinai but also in acts of terrorism throughout Egypt.
While Morsi was in power, he is believed to have
sought negotiations with some of the less radical Sinai groups and also hoped to develop the peninsula
economically in order to reduce the causes of instability, radicalism, and violence.149 However enlightened this approach may have seemed, it was too onedimensional to succeed and, as noted, allowed these
groups to grow. The Sisi government has responded
to this threat in a radically different but equally onedimensional manner, with an emphasis on military
means. Thus far, such iron fist policies have not defeated the Sinai Province organization and other terrorist groups, nor have they reduced their ability to
engage in complex terrorist strikes. In one particularly
deadly attack on October 24, 2014, at least 33 soldiers
were killed.150 The government responded to this disaster with a rapid decision to demolish houses on
the Egyptian side of the border with the Gaza Strip
(with compensation to the owners) in order to create a
buffer zone there. The government expects this buffer
zone to help stem the flow of weapons and militants
across the border.151 Nevertheless, at the time of this
writing, government forces, especially those in Sinai,
continue to endure sophisticated attacks by terrorist
forces. Police officers, soldiers, and security officials
have been attacked at checkpoints, police stations,
military camps, and while traveling in their vehicles.
On July 1, 2015, in one particularly horrific effort, a
wave of simultaneous attacks through Sinai killed 64
soldiers.152 These ongoing security problems seem to
indicate that Sisi’s approach to internal security is not
showing much success.
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While Egypt has faced a number of challenges
since Morsi’s removal from power, it has continued
to consolidate its relations with a number of important regional allies. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have a
number of overlapping security interests and have
coordinated on all major regional security issues, although the policy views of each county’s leadership
are by no means identical on some important issues
such as the war in Syria. The Gulf Arab states (except
for Qatar) were openly hostile to the U.S. decision to
hold the Egyptian Army even minimally responsible
for the 2013 ouster of a democratic government and its
violent aftermath. Many of these states were worried
about the possibility of an Egyptian rapprochement
with Iran under Morsi, which seemed possible despite
the strong differences between Tehran and Cairo on
the Syrian revolution. The process reached a point of
alarm following then-President Ahmadinejad’s visit
to Cairo in early-2013.153 Israel is also supportive of
the Sisi government and strongly favors efforts by the
United States to continue providing Cairo with weapons. Like the Egyptians, Israelis are deeply concerned
about the insurgency in the Sinai, which they view as
a threat.
In addition to the terrorists operating out of Sinai,
IS-affiliated forces in Libya have also struck at Egypt
from Libya. In one particularly egregious episode, ISaffiliated terrorists kidnapped and then executed 31
Coptic Christian Egyptians who had been abducted
from the city of Surt.154 The Egyptian military responded with a February 16 air strike on what were
described as IS camps, training centers, and weapons
storage areas in Libya.155 These attacks did not deter IS
from engaging in other atrocities, and in April 2015, IS
released a video showing the execution of dozens of
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Ethiopian Christians by shooting and beheading.156 ISaffiliated fighters in Libya have also claimed responsibility for attacks on Libyan government buildings,
foreign embassies, a major Libyan oil field, and militias based in the city of Misurata.
IS forces did not appear in Libya until 2014, but
they have expanded dramatically since that time and
may currently have as many as 3,000 fighters.157 IS in
Libya has been able to survive because of the security vacuum that has resulted from two rival political
leaderships, each claiming to be the legitimate government. The internationally recognized government,
which is led effectively by General Khalifa Haftar, is
based in the eastern cities of Tobruk and Bayda, while
the pro-Islamist Libyan Dawn government is based in
Tripoli. Hiftar is a Qadhafi-era general who defected in
1990 and returned to Libya following the outbreak of
civil war in 2011. Haftar’s government is strongly supported by Egypt’s President Sisi and by other conservative Arab governments, which have been shocked
by the rapid development of the Libyan IS threat.158
The rival governments have often seemed more intent on fighting each other than on fighting IS.159 This
situation may improve as a result of UN-sponsored
unity talks, but this remains uncertain. IS currently
controls the large coastal city of Surt and until lateJuly 2015 maintained militia in the eastern city of
Derna. The force in Derna has now been driven out
of the city by local Islamists, who did not wish to cede
their authority to IS.160 This is an interesting example
since some other local militias may also be willing to
resist any IS incursions into areas under their control,
and thus limit IS opportunities, even in the absence
of a unified Libyan government. Unfortunately, it is
not clear that this factor will be decisive in all future
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instances. The Libyan branch of IS has also been reported to be extremely close to the main organization
with its headquarters in Syria, so it may be able to obtain meaningful assistance with recruiting and funds
from this source.161
The Ongoing Crucible of Yemen.
Yemen is a large, important, but also economically impoverished Arab country having a lengthy
border with Saudi Arabia and direct access to key
strategic waterways including the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden. It is currently the only nonmonarchy on
the Arabian Peninsula as well as one of that region’s
more heavily populated countries, with around 2425 million people. Yemen’s most important political
figure from 1978-2012 was then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who left office in February 2012, during the
Arab Spring, as the result of massive and unrelenting
domestic, regional, and international pressure for him
to resign. In this chaotic environment, Yemen’s Gulf
neighbors became concerned about the escalating
crisis in that country and the prospects for spreading
instability. The nations of the GCC states led by Saudi
Arabia consequently played a major role in easing
Saleh out of office. Saleh’s Vice President Abd Rabbuh
Mansur Hadi then became acting head of state and
was elected president under a transition plan in which
he was the only candidate on the ballot.162
Hadi never had the same kind of carefully cultivated power base as his predecessor and also lacks many
of the former president’s political skills. To the extent
that he could, Hadi waged an uncompromising war
against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
the most powerful and dangerous of the al-Qaeda
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affiliates. This effort produced important results but
also required extensive funding from the GCC states
and the U.S. support of the Yemeni armed forces
with military training programs and the use of armed
drones against terrorist targets.163 Hadi was particularly assertive in a 2012 offensive against AQAP, which
had previously seized a significant amount of territory in southern Yemen during the turmoil of the Arab
Spring when Saleh was challenged and overthrown.164
While Yemeni forces pushed AQAP out of the cities
and towns that it had held prior to the offensive, the
organization remained powerful and was still able to
conduct spectacular acts of terrorism against government institutions.165 During this military offensive,
there were also some signs of problems within the
Yemeni regular military, which often seemed to play
a secondary role in the fighting. These soldiers were
overshadowed by the extensive use of U.S. drones to
disrupt AQAP command and control and perhaps
more tellingly by the use of Yemeni tribal fighters for
ground combat. These irregular tribal fighters were
paid well with GCC money and have sometimes been
referred to as mercenaries.166 The need for tribal fighters as an indispensable element of the offensive was
an important indicator of ongoing dysfunction within
the regular military.
AQAP is usually perceived by Western analysts
and policymakers as the dominant threat to Yemeni
peace and security, but their activities have been
greatly overshadowed by the Houthi movement,
which seized the capital of Sana’a in September 2014.
The Houthis are Zaydi Shi’ites who have maintained
a long history of disagreement with the central government in Sana’a. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s,
the Yemeni government aggravated its problems with
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the Houthis by allowing a number of Saudi funded
missionaries to establish religious institutions in
northern Yemen.167 These institutions were designed
to advance Sunni Salafi versions of Islam and seek
converts among the Houthi citizens and youth. Such
missionaries usually viewed Shi’ite religious beliefs
in an unsympathetic and sometimes an outright toxic
light, and their actions were viewed as confrontational
and provocative by the Houthi leadership. The Yemeni government nevertheless did not wish to restrict
the movement of these clerics into Yemen and thereby
potentially offend Saudi Arabia, which was a chief
source of Sana’a’s foreign aid. The Yemeni government later attempted to arrest the Houthi leadership,
sparking a series of counterinsurgency wars from 2004
until 2010.168
Saudi Arabia entered the anti-Houthi fighting for
the first time in northern Yemen in November 2009. At
this time, a group of Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi
territory, killing at least two border guards and apparently taking control of two or more Saudi border
villages. In response, Riyadh took swift and decisive
action with military strikes against Houthi rebels rapidly unfolding as the largest combat operation that
they had undertaken since the 1991 Gulf War. Saudi
tactics in this conflict involved the heavy use of artillery and airpower bombardment followed by the deployment of infantry in mopping up operations. Such
tactics were only partially successful as the Houthis
proved tough and resilient in the face of bombing and
artillery fire. The Saudi army reported that at least
133 of its soldiers were killed in action, with an undisclosed number of others wounded or captured in
the fighting.169 The Saudis discontinued their military
involvement in the war in February 2010 when Houthi
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forces withdrew from Saudi territory, and a cease-fire
involving both the Yemeni and Saudi governments
was established, with all Saudi prisoners returned.
Later, the Houthis gained an important opportunity
to assert greater autonomy in their home province of
Saada in 2011-12 when the Saleh government was coping with massive domestic unrest across a wide cross
section of the Yemeni population.
The 2015 capture of Sana’a by Houthi rebels fighting the Hadi government sent shock waves through
the GCC states, although it was initially unclear if
the Houthis would seek to hold the city indefinitely
or expand their power elsewhere in Yemen. Many of
the Arab leaders were concerned about having potentially pro-Iranian Shi’ites in power in Yemen. Most of
the conservative Arab leaders have been especially
concerned that Houthi clout in Yemen could lead to
a wider role for Tehran in the southern Arabian Peninsula. There is no doubt that Iran is providing help
to the Houthis, including weapons, but it is a mistake
to simply view them as Iranian stooges.170 As Shi’ites,
the Houthis did not expect support from Sunni Arab
states during their confrontation with the Yemeni
government, and Iran appeared to offer their only
option as a strong external ally capable of providing
them with material help and political support. Iraq, by
contrast, has provided the Houthis with some rhetorical and diplomatic support but nothing more despite
its own Shi’ite-led government.171
Much like the Iraqi army in Mosul in 2014, the Yemeni army failed to put up a serious defense against
the Houthi rebels when they entered Sana’a. The circumstances were somewhat different in this instance
than those in Iraq. In Iraq, large elements of the military (especially Sunnis) did not wish to fight for the
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corrupt, Shi’ite-dominated government of Maliki, and
there were also a large number of Iraqi soldiers who
were terrified by demonstrated IS brutality. In Yemen,
by contrast, much of the army viewed Hadi as weak,
and some officers had remained loyal to ousted Saleh.
Additionally, Hadi was unpopular with large elements
of the public for ending fuel subsidies and more generally failing to improve Yemen’s desperate economic
situation.172 Saleh, despite his previous involvement
in fighting the Houthis, was now prepared to strike a
tactical alliance with them. This sort of duplicity and
Machiavellian maneuvering had characterized his 33year rule and correspondingly cannot be considered a
surprise. Before his ouster, Saleh seemed to be preparing his son, Ahmed, to be Yemen’s next president.173
Even after leaving power, he may not have given up
on that hope, and many of his supporters openly called
for Ahmed’s return to run for president.174 Hadi previously appointed Ahmed as ambassador to the UAE
in April 2013 in an effort to remove him from a direct
role in Yemeni politics.175 Hadi then fired Ahmed from
that position during his own exile in Saudi Arabia in
March 2015, and the UAE correspondingly stripped
him of his diplomatic status and privileges.176
Hadi fled house arrest in Sana’a in February 2015
and quickly established himself in the southern city of
Aden. He clearly hoped to set up a rival center of power there and prove that his presidency was still viable.
While Hadi’s ability to do this was usually viewed as
doubtful, he was able to shore up considerable foreign
support, with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab powers moving their embassies to Aden.177 Hadi’s ability
to mobilize foreign support for his presidency now
seemed a serious threat, and the Houthis began seizing additional territory with the clear strategic goal
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of eventually capturing Aden. The Houthi movement
against Aden triggered Saudi-led military intervention against the Houthis on March 26, 2015. Riyadh
gave the United States only a few hours’ notice of its
impending military actions in Yemen.178
Riyadh assembled a 10-nation coalition to participate in the Yemen intervention. Other members of the
coalition included Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan,
Pakistan, and all of the GCC countries except Oman.179
The Pakistani commitment provoked a major domestic backlash, and Islamabad correspondingly never
rendered any tangible assistance to the campaign.180
At the time of this writing, the intervention consists
mostly of an air campaign, although some nations, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have sent warships
off the Yemeni coast and have shelled land targets.
The Egyptian government also initially suggested that
it was willing to send ground troops to Yemen “if necessary,” although it is extremely doubtful they would
have ever followed through on this commitment.181
Limited numbers of Saudi and Emirati forces began
fighting in Aden later in the war and have served as
leaders of GCC trained and paid Yemeni units that
entered Aden by sea, probably from Saudi Arabia and
the UAE.182 Additionally, in late-July 2015, the UAE
sent a 1,500 person brigade of its own troops to Aden.
This force appeared to be a mechanized infantry unit
and has taken some casualties.183 All of these forces
have played an important role in clearing Houthi
forces from Aden and surrounding areas.
Almost immediately after the operation began,
Washington offered expanded logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia and its regional partners.184 The United States established a joint coordination and planning cell in the Saudi operations center,
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and weapons deliveries were also expedited.185 In April
2015, the Pentagon also announced that the United
States was providing aerial refueling for some coalition aircraft. Kerry also warned Iran against efforts to
intensify its aid to the Houthis during the fighting. He
cited flights coming in from Iran early in the fighting,
which he seemed to imply were carrying weapons and
war supplies.186 To underscore the U.S. alliance with
Saudi Arabia, Washington sent the aircraft carrier USS
Theodore Roosevelt and an escort ship to join other U.S.
naval ships in the waters off Yemen. The carrier was a
reassuring presence to Saudi and Egyptian naval vessels enforcing a newly established UN ban forbidding
weapons transfers to the Houthis. Washington may
have been especially motived to demonstrate support for Saudi regional concerns following the conclusion of the interim framework agreement on Iranian
nuclear issues that proceeded the JCPOA. The Saudis
had reluctantly endorsed this agreement, but they had
also been extremely concerned about the possibility of
such a development for years.187 They are also deeply
uneasy about any agreement that reduces Iran’s international isolation and allows it to begin rebuilding its
economy, which has been badly racked by sanctions.
The Saudis have stated that they wish to restore
Hadi’s government, but his internal base of support remains extremely weak. Various militia forces in Aden
have fiercely resisted the Houthis whom they view as
enemies, but many of these same groups do not support Hadi.188 Instead, they have fought for anti-Houthi
reasons or simply because they do not wish any group
representing northern Yemen to have authority in the
south. Rather, many would like to see the south restored to its previous status as an independent country.189 Some reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has also
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used its embassy in Aden to help organize and fund
anti-Houthi tribal fighters, who, as previously noted,
can often be significantly more effective than the Yemeni regular army.190 Nevertheless, these tribal combatants are fighting for money and correspondingly
cannot be considered part of Hadi’s power base.
The Saudi Arabian Air Force has conducted most of
the bombing strikes against Yemeni targets, although
Jordan, and especially the UAE, have also participated in some missions.191 Unsurprisingly, the Saudi-led
bombing of Yemen has further damaged relations between the GCC states and Iran. While Riyadh justified
the GCC intervention on the basis of supporting the
legitimate president, its basic strategic concern was
limiting Iranian influence in Yemen. Iran’s Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the intervention “genocide” while also asserting that Saudi Arabia
is “as bad as Israel.”192 The Iranian leader also stated
that “inexperience youths have taken over the affairs
of the state and are replacing dignity with barbarity.”193 This was a personal insult to King Salman, who
appointed his then-29-year-old son to serve as Saudi
Defense Minister in 2015.194
The GCC problem with the Houthi rise was compounded by the new AQAP assertiveness in Yemen
due to the security vacuum created by the Hadi government’s failures. While the GCC would like to prevent Houthi dominance of Yemen, it also wishes to do
so in a way that does not benefit AQAP. Since these
two forces are fighting each other, they are at least incapable of presenting a united front, although they can
do a lot of damage to GCC interests separately.195 The
rise of the Houthis and the collapse of Hadi’s already
limited authority has also provided AQAP with a variety of opportunities to conduct important large-scale
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operations within Yemen. In one particularly dramatic
development on April 2, 2015, AQAP fighters stormed
a prison in Hadramaut Province and freed 300 prisoners, including many of their imprisoned comrades.196
On July 1, 2015, an even more alarming jail break took
place when 1,200 prisoners were reported to have
been freed from the central prison in the city of Taiz.197
An undisclosed number of these prisoners are AQAP
members or supporters.198 In early 2015, AQAP was
also able to seize and control territory including the
port of Mukallah, Yemen’s fifth largest city, although
it had worked together with local officials and tribes
in a possible attempt to prove that it is no longer interested in implementing the types of brutality associated with previous AQAP control of Yemeni territory.199 The Houthis sometimes maintain that AQAP
will seize any land that they relinquish control over as
part of a peace agreement.
Despite the importance of AQAP in Yemen, there
is a limited but expanding role by Yemeni associates
of the Islamic State organization. On March 20, 2015,
fighters claiming to be associated with IS conducted
their first major operation in Yemen using suicide
bombers to attack a number of Shi’ite mosques, killing 142 people and wounding more than 350. A few
days later, a newly announced “Green Brigade” asserting IS ties claimed to have killed a few Houthis in
the central province of Ibb.200 Since that time a number
of skirmishes have taken place between Yemeni or
Houthi soldiers and fighters claiming an IS affiliation.
Mosques utilized by Shi’ites have remained a favored
IS target.201
A potential advantage for AQAP and IS supporters
in Yemen is the crippling of U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation. The United States has withdrawn
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125 Special Forces trainers and other U.S. personnel
from Yemen as it has descended into chaos.202 Washington has also withdrawn its embassy from Sana’a
and relocated the U.S. diplomatic mission to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia.203 This move enormously complicates
counterterrorism coordination with both the Yemeni
government institutions that remain in that country
and the Yemeni military. These conditions have not
ended drone use, although the potential for collateral
damage with armed drones is virtually always enhanced by the lack of accurate intelligence obtained
by friendly forces on the ground.204 Without such
intelligence, the United States has been reported to
have been forced to rely on “signature strikes” against
AQAP targets in Yemen. Signature strikes involve selecting targets based on observed patterns of behavior rather than precise information on the identity of
targeted personnel.205 Despite their controversial nature, these efforts have sometimes yielded important
results, as when a June 2015 drone strike killed AQAP
chief Nasir al-Wuhayshi.206
It is difficult to envision the Yemeni war going on
indefinitely without creating a massive humanitarian
crisis. Yemen was a desperately poor country even
before the fighting began, and it now faces the danger of large amounts of people being unable to access
food and uncontaminated drinking water. Diseases
are spreading throughout the country, and large scale
epidemics appear possible.207 While the Saudi leadership detests the Houthis to the point that serious
diplomatic progress with them does not seem likely,
Riyadh is more willing to negotiate with former President Saleh, who is also a key part of the conflict.208
The strong position of the Hadi government in Aden
also improves the Saudi negotiating position and may
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help the Saudis reach an overall agreement. It is not,
however, clear if Yemen will emerge from this crisis as
one or two countries. It is fully possible that an independent south will re-emerge from this crisis and will
align strongly with Riyadh.
U.S. Defense Ties with the Gulf Arab States.
In addressing the threats that they currently face,
Arab allies must balance domestic public opinion with
defense needs. Many Arab states have maintained a
long and problematic history with Western military
bases on their territory, and this background influences current Gulf Arab decisionmaking on how to
organize military cooperation with the United States.
Until at least the 1950s, great powers often maintained
that their bases were designed to defend regional nations against foreign invaders, but the presence of
such facilities was sometimes used to pressure and
influence local governments. In response to these concerns, as well as changing Western military requirements and economic pressures, Western permanent
military presence in the Middle East steadily declined,
and a number of major bases were evacuated in response to nationalist demands. By the early-1970s, the
United States and other Western nations had dramatically scaled down their presence in the area. Western
combat units currently retain an ongoing presence
at military facilities only in some smaller Gulf Arab
states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
In Jordan, the United States maintains hundreds of
military personnel in that country to prepare for the
large and important Eager Lion exercise (discussed
later). The U.S. Army also stationed significant forces
in Saudi Arabia during and after Operations DESERT
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SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990-91, but these
forces were withdrawn in 2003. Iraqi bases host U.S.
advisors and planners (along with some force protection units) but not U.S. Army or Marine Corps
maneuver combat units.
Most of the Gulf Arab countries traditionally have
not favored large numbers of ground forces permanently stationed on their territory, and some have
shown a preference for air or naval bases. Western
facilities in Bahrain support the U.S. Fifth Fleet, while
Qatar and the UAE allow the U.S. Air Force to utilize
key air bases, although only a limited number of U.S.
aircraft regularly use these facilities. Many of the U.S.
combat aircraft currently used to protect the Gulf are
naval aircraft stationed on aircraft carriers, although
the U.S. Air Force presence in the region can be expanded in emergency situations. Conversely, Kuwait
has a much more extensive history of hosting both U.S.
ground and air forces, with many U.S. Army troops
being stationed at Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait
city.209 Currently, Camp Arifjan is an important transit point for equipment being returned to the United
States from Afghanistan. At this time, around 13,500
U.S. service members are stationed in Kuwait, down
from 25,000 during the last stages of the U.S. military
presence in Iraq.210 Around 40,000 U.S. military personnel of all services are deployed to the Middle East
(mostly the Gulf) at any one time.
Military Exercises.
Large military exercises have been somewhat less
prominent over the last few years as ongoing wars
in the region have required the attention of both the
United States and its regional partners. A number of
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Arab air forces have been engaged in air combat operations as part of the struggles in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Some Arab naval forces, including those of Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, also may have been marginally involved in the fighting in Yemen. Limited numbers of
Saudi and Emirati ground forces have also fought in
Yemen, as noted earlier. Yet, if joint U.S.-Arab military exercises have been somewhat overshadowed
by actual combat recently, they nevertheless remain
important to all parties. One of the most important advantages of military exercises is that some Arab countries, which display reticence about large numbers of
foreign ground troops being stationed permanently
on their soil, seek other forms of cooperation with U.S.
military forces. The decision to reduce significantly
U.S. Army forces in Europe from Cold War levels
is also widely understood to complicate U.S. power
projection into the Middle East by moving troops
farther away, although that trend may eventually be
reversed. The 2014-15 difficulties in Ukraine, Crimea,
and elsewhere in Eastern Europe may lead to a significant upward revision of the optimal numbers of
U.S. forces in Europe. Currently, such actions appear
to be confined mostly to pre-positioning weapons and
equipment, including M1A2 tanks and M2A3/M3A3
Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, for use of military
exercises or other training.211
Throughout the Middle East, many Arab countries
are extremely interested in working with the U.S. military in joint exercises to help them continue professionalizing their armed forces and raising their standards
for conventional defense, joint operations, intelligence
operations, counterinsurgency, and other capabilities.
U.S. commitment to support these activities through
both training and exercises is clearly reassuring to
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friendly Arab states that are seeking to warn their enemies against aggressive action. To help meet these
concerns, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
made a number of visits to the region and also made
a number of strong statements about the continuing
U.S. interest in the region. In December 2013, he gave
a particularly important speech at a conference in
Manama, Bahrain, designed to underscore the future
U.S. commitment to the partnership with Gulf allies.
Hagel acknowledged that Arab allies were concerned
over the U.S. decision to rebalance forces to Asia and
cuts to the U.S. Defense budget, but insisted that these
changes did not mean the abandonment of the Middle
East. Hagel then envisioned a U.S. military presence
of around 35,000 personnel and a U.S. Army footprint
of 10,000 troops in the region.212 These numbers are
somewhat larger now with around 40,000 military
personnel in the Middle East at any one time.213 Hagel
also noted that the United States maintained around
40 ships at sea in the region including an aircraft carrier battle group. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter
has also embraced these policies when he replaced
Hagel.214
In this environment, many friendly Arab political
and military leaders have found U.S.-led bilateral or
multinational military exercises to be an exceptionally
valuable tool for their security. Exercises, unlike basing rights, do not involve a long-term military presence that can grate on domestic public opinion and
provide the appearance of excessive U.S. influence.
Rather, military exercises can more easily be portrayed as a collaboration, in which the United States
is showing its support for local militaries by working
with them. Another advantage is that at times of domestic Arab political tension, exercises can usually be
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rescheduled by the host government. Conversely, at
times of regional tension, regularly scheduled exercises can be expanded and the number of U.S. troops
participating in the exercise can be increased to show
support for the host government. Such expansions
are generally seen in the region as a show of force, although their linkage to previously planned exercises
allows the United States and its allies to deny that they
are being provocative. Exercise Eager Lion, which is
based in Jordan and involves the United States and a
number of Gulf Arab allies, may be an example of this
approach. Also, as a result of the July 2015 JCPOA, the
United States is considering increasing the scope and
number of multilateral exercises in the Gulf as a way
of reassuring regional allies.215
Another reason for a vigorous ongoing U.S.-Gulf
exercise program involves Iranian actions. The Iranians frequently engage in large-scale joint exercises,
which they use for both training and propaganda purposes. The land component of these exercises is usually defensive, focusing on responding to a U.S.-led
invasion of the Iranian homeland, which appears to be
one of their primary military concerns. The Iranians
usually proclaim these exercises to be completely successful and routinely exaggerate the numbers of forces
involved, although the exercises remain meaningful as
political theater.216 U.S.-led maritime exercises include
not only large units, but also smaller ships. Multinational military exercises focused on anti-mining operations are particularly important since mine warfare
is an important part of Iran’s maritime strategy that,
as with land forces, stresses asymmetric capabilities.217
As with landpower and airpower, Iran is totally outclassed by allied capabilities at sea and therefore will
continue to develop asymmetric capabilities in areas
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such as submarine warfare, mine warfare, and the use
of fast small armed boats.
The centerpiece of the Middle Eastern military
exercise program was formerly Exercise Bright Star,
held in Egypt. Unless cancelled for political or military reasons, Egypt has previously hosted Bright Star
every 2 years. Bright Star exercises began in 1980 following the conclusion of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, with the most recent exercise occurring
in October 2009. This exercise has served as a large,
multinational training exercise that helps foster the
interoperability of U.S., Egyptian, and allied forces.
Bright Star eventually became the most important U.S.
supported military exercise in the Middle East and a
showpiece of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. It
was cancelled in 2003 due to U.S. commitments to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was cancelled again
in 2011 due to the Egyptian revolution and in 2013 due
to U.S. concerns about the ouster of Morsi by the military. The outlook for this exercise therefore appears
to be uncertain for the foreseeable future due primarily to U.S.-Egyptian differences over human rights as
well as Egypt’s focus on suppressing a very serious
insurgency within its borders. Nevertheless, in early
August 2015, Kerry stated that the United States and
Egypt were moving toward resuming Bright Star, although details about any progress in this effort have
not been made public.218
While never directly presented overseas as a replacement for Bright Star, the Jordanian-based Exercise Eager Lion has been conducted for 5 consecutive
years since 2011 (twice as often as Bright Star under its
normal circumstances). Exercise Eager Lion has grown
out of the earlier and smaller Exercise Infinite Moonlight, which began in 1996 and continued until the

59

establishment of Eager Lion, with some interruptions
because of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This earlier bilateral exercise centered on the strong participation of
the U.S. Marine Corps and focused primarily on Jordanian security rather than wider regional concerns.
In the future, it will be possible for the conservative
Arab states to expand their limited participation in
Eager Lion exercises due to the uncertain status of the
Egyptian-based Bright Star exercises.
Eager Lion has an especially robust landpower
component, which is important for U.S-Arab cooperation. In many Arab states, the army is the dominant
service, and in all Arab countries, it is an important
military service, so coordination with Arab ground
forces will be especially important. In only a few
wealthy Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, has the air
force been more favored historically (primarily due to
air force requirements for fewer human resources and
a belief that armies rather than air forces can more effectively conduct anti-government coups). All of the
Gulf States have small navies that function primarily
as coastal defense forces, but U.S. Navy joint exercises
with Arab navies are important due to the need to defend the numerous strategic waterways in the region.
They will probably never involve the level of U.S.-Arab coordination and cooperation as exercises involving landpower, although the large joint U.S. military
presence is vital for the defense of the region.219
Many observers believe Eager Lion also sends a
message of solidarity with Jordan at a time of immense
concern over Syria and Iraq. The message might have
been reinforced by the U.S. decision to leave a Patriot
missile battery and a limited number of F-16 fighter
aircraft behind for use in future exercises.220 Since Eager Lion 2013, about 700-900 U.S. Army and Air Force
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personnel remained in Jordan to support these systems, along with around 100 soldiers stationed there
throughout the year as a forward headquarters of the
1st Armored Division.221 Although Jordan is not a Gulf
State, it is an Arab monarchy which works extremely
closely with both the Gulf Arabs and the United States
on regional security matters. Ongoing Gulf participation in large multinational Eager Lion exercises may
send an additional important message of U.S.-Gulf
solidarity. The Gulf States are also involved in numerous smaller bilateral exercises with the United
States within their own territory as well as the GCC’s
Peninsula Shield exercises.222
The Importance of Regionally Aligned Forces.
In addition to military exercises, such as Eager
Lion, one potentially effective way of improving U.S.
landpower coordination with its Arab allies is through
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs). RAFs units are a
U.S. Army initiative based on the lessons of the Iraq
and Afghanistan wars as well as earlier efforts to prepare U.S. Army units to fight in various regions. Aspects of the RAFs initiative are still undergoing evaluation and may be subject to ongoing modification over
time. The concept involves U.S. Army maneuver combat units and their support forces being focused on a
specific Geographic Combatant Command region as
part of their normal training program.223 This concept
was initially tested with a program to prepare the first
such brigade for service with Africa Command, where
it was successful enough to be considered a model
for the Army component of the other Geographic
Combatant Commands.
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RAFs units are expected to incorporate militarily
useful information about the regions on which they
are focused into planning and training. This approach
is partially enabled through interaction with their
counterparts from friendly regional countries. These
units are expected to receive cultural training and language familiarization for the areas where they might
be required to operate. By working more closely with
regional militaries on a recurring basis, U.S. personnel are expected to interface quickly and effectively
with their counterparts during an escalating crisis.
Ideally, the soldiers of each nation will gain a working knowledge of the other states’ Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and establish good working relationships with their counterparts in partner military
forces. Additionally, the U.S. Army and partner militaries seek to establish a common understanding of
key military considerations that would enhance their
ability to train and fight effectively together. Cooperation with local forces also has been strongly enhanced
by the presence of numerous officers from allied nations who have received training and military education in the United States. An additional advantage is
that English is widely spoken by officers in most Gulf
militaries and some other militaries (such as that of
Jordan) within the larger Middle East.
A central idea of the RAFs is that by gaining an
enhanced understanding of the area, these units will
avoid a “cold start” in actual military operations and
identify avoidable mistakes in coordination, communications, and planning early in the process.224 The
projected reduction in U.S. Army division, corps,
and Army Service Component Command staffs by 25
percent will make such efficiencies especially important in future operations.225 Subjects of military utility
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include cultures and subcultures (including ethnic
and religious minorities); rural and urban geography
(especially infrastructure); relevant languages; and the
organization, doctrine, and effectiveness of partner
militaries. The expense of such programs is somewhat
mitigated by the fact that not every maneuver combat
unit needs to be aligned with a Geographic Combat
Command, but even limited expertise could be useful.226 General Raymond Odierno’s political advisor in
Iraq, Emma Sky, has provided some insight on this
problem, noting that U.S. forces entered the country
with a deeply oversimplified view of the potential for
conflict in Iraq once Saddam had been removed. In
general terms, she felt that too many officers simply
assumed that the only serious potential for violence
was fighting between die-hard Baathists and newly
liberated Iraqis. Sky maintains that U.S. military forces were slow in understanding the ethnic and sectarian problems that might arise from other sources such
as intensified conflict between the Sunni and Kurdish
populations, the area in which she was stationed early
in the war.227 A greater awareness of these types of
problems could be especially useful during any future
rapidly evolving conflict that includes U.S. military
participation.
A potential problem with RAFs is the difficulty and
expense of soldiers gaining reasonable proficiency in
some skills associated with the concept. Gaining an
in-depth cultural knowledge of the region including
key differences between various sub-cultures is often
difficult, but even a limited amount of knowledge
on such subjects can be useful if the limited scope of
this knowledge is fully understood. In contrast, language proficiency is almost always the most difficult
of RAFs-related skills to master, often being expensive

63

and time consuming.228 Even a basic proficiency in
Arabic or other Middle Eastern languages can never
be gained in the pre-deployment courses of 8 or 16
weeks, since these languages are extraordinarily difficult for Westerners to learn. Soldiers encountering unfamiliar local dialects would also have serious problems in communicating, even if they have been given
more comprehensive language study. A further problem is that much of the language training is not maintained for soldiers that are rotated back to the United
States and then redeployed at a later date.229 Noting
these shortcomings, there is still value in providing
language familiarization to soldiers, but the limitation
of this effort is important to understand. Basic words
and phrases can sometimes be of considerably more
value than knowing nothing about a language. Additionally, in many cultures and often in the Middle
East, local people seem to genuinely appreciate efforts by U.S. personnel to use their language. Under
these circumstances, language familiarization remains
important to RAF units.
Cultural and linguistic knowledge also has value
for other reasons than warfighting. Often U.S. military
forces extensively interact with civilian populations as
part of both warfighting and in a post-conflict environment. Sometimes they are asked to work with civilians
to a much greater extent than they ever expected, such
as in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At
this time, many U.S. officers believed that their forces
would be replaced or at least supplemented by what
Sky and her associates were told would be “a rapidly
deployable team of experts with resources and readymade systems.”230 The shorthand for this concept was
“government in a box,” which never came, despite the
promises given to the U.S. military about nongovern-
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mental organizations and other forms of civilian support. These people, not the military, were expected
to address the majority of problems involving nonsecurity issues with the civilian population. Sky sarcastically describes the entire concept as a “mythical”
rather than a “magical” concept, much to the disappointment of many soldiers, who saw such activities
as completely different from their primary mission of
warfighting.231
Currently, some of the aspects of the RAFs concept
are being addressed in meaningful ways by large and
important units. The 1st Armored Division, based in
Fort Bliss, Texas, has been aligned with U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) and has played an important role in the Eager Lion exercises previously discussed.232 During various Eager Lion exercises, the
1st Armored Division provided the bulk of the U.S.
Army ground forces assigned to the exercise. As part
of the alignment with CENTCOM, 1st Armored Division has assisted the Jordanians with integrated missile defense, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief.233 A strong working relationship with Jordan is
particularly useful since forces operating out of this
country can move into the Gulf area quickly if they
are needed. The presence of such forces at times of
crisis in the Gulf could be a restraining influence on
potential aggressors. Adding to these advantages, the
King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center
(KASOTC), about 20 kilometers northeast of Amman,
has also been proven to be an excellent command and
control site for combined U.S.-Jordanian operations.234
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The Challenges of Building Partner Capacity
and Sharing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency.
The concept of building partner capacity has undergone serious setbacks in mid-2014 due to the catastrophic military problems suffered by both the Iraqi
and Yemeni armies at that time. The United States had
strong train and equip programs for each of these countries in the past, and the program for Yemen was ongoing when the Yemeni military fragmented in September 2014.235 Additionally, harsher critics maintain that
the Iraqi Army is too corrupt to assume the challenges
of a serious military force, pointing to such problems
as officer kickbacks and “ghost soldiers,” who receive
salaries (usually pocketed by their officers) and have
their names on personnel rosters but do not serve in
units.236 There is also the question of how much can be
accomplished by training foreign soldiers serving in
countries with corrupt civilian and military elites. In
a forceful statement on this problem, former Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John
McLaughlin said, “People don’t fight because they’ve
been trained; they fight because they believe in something. At present, the biggest believers in the region
are with the Islamic State.”237 These problems indicate
that train and equip programs, while important, will
not work well in instances where governments are
widely viewed as illegitimate by significant elements
of their population and officer corps are involved in
excessive corruption.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced
the understanding that counterinsurgencies often can
take years, if not decades, to resolve. These operations
require time, public patience, and significant numbers
of troops trained in counterinsurgency tactics. These
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troops optimally should be provided by the government rather than an outside power. Air and naval
forces can play important supporting roles in counterinsurgencies, but ground forces almost always have
to take the lead. Armed drones have also played an
important role in countries such as Yemen, but strike
weapons can only address certain aspects of the insurgent problem. They can kill insurgents but cannot
reassert government authority in contested areas. It
is therefore important that U.S. Army forces continue
to provide practical advice and assistance to friendly
nations, while maintaining as light a footprint as possible in those countries where military reform is possible and enabled by political reform.238
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps learned a great
deal during the fighting in Iraq that may be useful for
addressing other Middle Eastern insurgencies. While
no two conflicts are alike, it is possible that some could
have value in addressing the insurgencies that currently exist in a number of Middle Eastern countries
including U.S. allies such as Egypt and Yemen. GCC
states also view both of these insurgencies as dangerous, but they are most clearly focused on the future of
Yemen.239 Currently, the GCC states, especially Saudi
Arabia, are more focused on removing the Houthis
from power, which they view as a prerequisite for
moving against AQAP. Although AQAP was defeated and lost overt control of the contested territory in
2012, it remained a strong terrorist and insurgent force
and never gave up on the idea of creating an al-Qaeda
emirate in southern Yemen, which could become a
threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.240 The
2015 capture of the city of Mukallah, discussed earlier,
is clearly an effort in that direction. In the long term,
AQAP can probably only be eradicated by a reformed
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Yemeni army that fights effectively and avoids largescale corruption. Moreover, Yemeni troops that are
inadequately trained for counterinsurgency can take
significant casualties and make serious mistakes that
harm the struggle against AQAP. Fortunately, at least
some Yemeni senior officers are also deeply committed to improving the quality of the force.241
The Iraqi government faces a hybrid war which
involves significant elements of conventional and insurgent warfare. Sectarian hatreds are also a powerful
component of this war. IS is directing acts of terrorism
against government facilities and institutions as well
as Shi’ite citizens in partial response to Sunni grievances but also to advance the IS agenda. The U.S. leadership will therefore have to make decisions on how
to help the Iraqi government with advice and military
equipment, while pushing it to be more inclusive and
less corrupt.242 A key to any successful counterinsurgency is to place distance between the insurgents and
the population where they operate. The Iraqi government cannot do this if it only serves the interest of its
Shi’ite citizens. U.S. Army training and other support
correspondingly must be closely linked to political reform, but military aid is vital and optimally effective
once the Iraqi government moves forward in a serious
effort at reform and Sunni inclusion.
Some important lessons of the Iraq War that may
be of the most interest to local forces are tactical. This
conflict involved a great deal of trial and error efforts
by deployed troops, who, over time, developed new
forms of “best practices” for the conduct of counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an excellent study of these issues, James A. Russell of the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School notes that, in these
circumstances, doctrine is only a general guide, and
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that the operational environment ultimately has a
tremendous impact on mission requirements.243 U.S.
troops also encountered relatively unexpected problems that they found limited and more comprehensive
solutions for over time. New tactics, techniques, and
procedures were developed as well as new and more
flexible SOPs.244 In one especially interesting insight,
Russell notes that random searches of houses were
regarded by the Iraqis as harassment, and this problem hurt U.S. military relations with the population.
In Ramadi, however, patrol leaders came up with a
highly innovative solution whereby affected citizens
were provided with gifts of small toys, candy, and
several two-pound bags of sugar to help reduce the
anger over such visits.245
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and
Counterterrorism Support.
Intelligence support is one of the forms of U.S. assistance that is most often requested by Arab states.246
Many Arab leaders consider U.S. intelligence information both useful and a sufficiently low profile form of
cooperation that will not usually excite nationalist anger. Such support is especially helpful in dealing with
insurgent groups such as IS and Yemen’s Houthis
which can field large military formations. Some Arab
countries such as Jordan have excellent intelligence
organizations, but they also have little choice except
to rely heavily on the use of human agents. The gap in
their capabilities usually involves the technical intelligence gathering that the United States is often considered to do very well. Arab governments concerned
about foreign-sponsored subversion and terrorism often view efficient intelligence organizations as vital to
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their well-being and perhaps even survival. While the
use of armed drones against terrorists tends to dominate headlines, unarmed drones are also an important
source of military intelligence for the United States
and its allies and may be particularly useful in counterinsurgency actions. According to the Defense News,
the United States was flying about 50 intelligence
gathering drone missions a day over Iraq in July 2014
in the aftermath of the seizure of northern Iraq by IS.247
The United States can also provide technical support to allied militaries including helping to protect
friendly command and control systems and the provision of cyber security technologies. Apart from battlefield counterintelligence, many Arab states are also
deeply concerned about IS, al-Qaeda, and other radical
cells operating within the civilian population of their
countries. These allies seek U.S. support and information sharing to deal with internal terrorist activity. The
problem became exceptionally serious in instances
where powerful al-Qaeda affiliates have sprung up as
a side effect of the Syrian civil war. Al-Nusra and the
Islamic State are difficult to classify as pure terrorism
and guerrilla warfare organizations since they also
practice conventional warfare. Correspondingly, the
Gulf States have also openly worried about “sleeper
cells” in their countries that either serve al-Qaeda and
its allies or those that might carry out acts of terrorism on the orders of Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah.248
Many states are also interested in U.S. technical help
in securing their borders from terrorist infiltration.249
The potential problem here is that U.S. officials want
to help these nations defeat terrorists, but they also
have to be careful to ensure that such intelligence is
not misused to strike at legitimate political opposition forces or groups targeted for ethnic or sectarian
reasons.
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Air and Missile Defense.
Many Arab states, especially those of the GCC, are
concerned about the extensive and formidable Iranian
surface-to-surface missile program.250 U.S. defense officials have stated that the United States is aware of
the Gulf States’ anxieties about Iranian missiles and
that the United States is determined to support them
in building a coordinated missile defense capability.251
The most important components of this layered defense are the Patriot air and missile defense system
and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system
(THAAD). Many partner countries within the region
already have Patriot systems and have or are now
acquiring PAC-3 anti-missile capabilities for those
systems. The United States has also rapidly moved
to increase the sale of PAC-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia
following the conclusion of the JCPOA with Iran and
support to other GCC nations is expected to increase
as well.252 The UAE has made THAAD purchases and
delivery is expected to begin in late-2015.253 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also expected to purchase THAAD
systems.254 With so much at stake, these states are
tremendously interested in working with the United
States on missile defense.
Surface-to-surface missiles (such as Scuds) have
been used extensively in some Middle Eastern wars,
although they have never been employed with unconventional (chemical, biological, or nuclear) warheads.
In the Gulf area, conflicts involving surface-to-surface
missiles include attacks made by both sides during the
Iran-Iraq war and missile strikes against Saudi targets
during Operation DESERT STORM.255 Saddam Hussein also reached outside of the Gulf area and fired 39
extended range Scud missiles at Israel during the 1991
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conflict, although there were very few Israeli casualties. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Scud missiles were
used by secessionist forces in Yemen during the 1994
civil war, and there have been some reports of Syrian
government forces occasionally firing Scuds at rebel
forces early in Syria’s civil war.256 One Scud missile
was apparently fired at Saudi Arabia by Houthi forces
in 2015 but was then believed to have been shot down
by a Saudi Patriot missile. Iran also has an extensive
program of missile development that is much more
sophisticated than the Scuds used in various Middle
Eastern wars. Iran is a large country, and many of
Iran’s longer range missiles can be located in remote
parts of the country and still strike the Gulf Arab countries and would be much more difficult to reach and
target with airpower than the shorter range Scuds.
Friendly Gulf military forces are extremely interested in additional systems to defend their airspace
against air and missile strikes because of the significant
resources that Iran has applied to its ballistic missile
program and the fear that Iranian missiles will eventually be armed with unconventional warheads.257 In
any scenario where Iranian missiles are fired at a Gulf
State, one might reasonably expect that U.S. and Gulf
air forces will seek to destroy as many of these systems
on the ground as possible. Such actions are indispensable, but there are continuing questions about how
long this will take. The last U.S. war against an enemy
which was well-armed with missiles occurred in 1991
in Iraq. At that time, Saddam Hussein’s forces were
able to fire a number of Scuds and modified Scuds at
coalition military forces and Israel despite a substantial air campaign to destroy these assets.
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The United States has sometimes pushed the GCC
states to consider ways of improving the level of integration of their missile defense systems. Hagel served
as the driving force behind a 2013 initiative allowing
the GCC to purchase missile defense systems as a bloc,
and then integrate their radars, sensors, and early
warning systems.258 This approach did not go forward
due to distrust among individual GCC members. Nevertheless, such efforts cannot be abandoned if these
countries are to optimize their defense. Moreover, a
truly integrated missile defense program will require
a high level of agreement among members about such
issues as rules of engagement and coordination. Leading U.S. defense expert Anthony H. Cordesman notes
that “You have to work out the entire engagement
structure before the first missile is ever launched.”259
Conclusions.
1. U.S. leaders need to be aware that Arab attitudes on their military ties with the United States
have changed since the 2003-11 Iraq War. While
many Arabs formerly believed U.S. policies into the
Middle East were too intrusive into their region, this
attitude is now less prevalent. Rather, many friendly
Arab leaders believe that the United States is no longer
as interested in strong military links to their countries
due to its experiences with war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arab states need to be reassured by both words
and actions that any new defense emphasis on Asia or
elsewhere is not to be conducted at their expense.
2. The United States must be aware of the increased concerns that Saudi Arabia and other Arab
states have about Iran. Saudi Arabia and various
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other Arab states detested Saddam Hussein but had
always hoped that he would be replaced by a friendly
Sunni strongman. The Saudis were not interested in
either a democratic Iraq or a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq.
Now Saudi leaders feel that Iraq has ceased to be a
bulwark against Iran and is instead a quasi-ally of Iran.
This development represents a significant change in
the balance of power which the Saudis and some of
their Arab allies believe is being played out in a more
aggressive foreign policy, including Iranian assertiveness on Bahrain and Yemen as well as Iraq. While
some of these concerns sound excessive to Western
ears, they are very real to many Arabs and must be
treated with respect. Nevertheless, if U.S. relations
with Iran improve dramatically (which is doubtful in
the short term), then that development will probably
result from conditions that will also allow for Arab
states to improve their relations with Iran.
3. Closely related to the previous point, the United States must continue to emphasize that any improvement in relations with Iran will not come at the
expense of other Middle Eastern allies. A dramatic
improvement in such relations remains uncertain and
the question of Iranian nuclear development is still
unclear. If the JCPOA negotiated by the P5+1 is successful, then questions will arise over how the global
community will interact with Iran in the future. Under no circumstances should the United States appear
to support an Iranian position of dominance in the
region, but it should also be willing to improve relations with Iran if the regime backs away from some of
its most repugnant policies. A key point here is that
the GCC states, Jordan, and even Egypt will continue
to depend upon the United States, and, to a lesser
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extent, the UK, to keep their militaries operational.
Limited and symbolic acts of cooperation with other
suppliers such as France and Russia can do little to
change this reality. The United States must therefore
carefully discuss its plans for future polices on Iran
with these states, but it cannot give them a veto over
U.S. policy initiatives.
4. The United States must continue arms sales to
friendly Arab states concerned about Iran, but cannot assume that relations will be harmonious because of these sales. Arab states buy military equipment from the United States both to modernize their
military forces and to consolidate relations with the
United States. If UN and other restrictions on arms
sales to Iran are eventually lifted as envisioned in the
Iranian nuclear agreement or if loopholes develop in
the future, these states will need more support.
5. The Strategy of “train and equip” or “arm and
train” for Arab allies needs to be retained but cannot be treated as a panacea for Middle East security
problems. Instead, it must be used in specific situations where the United States objectively assesses
foreign soldiers to be both trainable and motivated.
After setbacks in Iraq and Yemen, it is now clear that
unmotivated officers and soldiers sometimes permeate allied militaries and cannot be depended upon to
fight regardless of how much effort is dedicated to
providing them with modern weapons and training.
To make matters worse, such soldiers may repeat the
2014 Mosul example and abandon massive amounts
of weapons and equipment to enemy forces. In future
scenarios, friendly forces receiving such training must
be evaluated continuously and honestly regarding
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their levels of motivation, and this information must
be collated and passed on to senior military leaders. U.S. officials must make assessments of friendly
troops’ vulnerabilities to enemy psychological warfare and the ways in which national government graft
and corruption filter into the military and cause a
breakdown of government legitimacy. It needs to be
well understood that a national military is usually
no better than the government it is asked to defend
and efforts at government reform must be pressed.
The alternative to this approach cannot be allowed to
become having U.S. forces fight the battles for these
troops and leave dysfunctional, unreformed militaries
in place. The United States should be willing to play a
supporting military role in helping regional allies and
not attempt to Americanize every conflict.
6. Closely related to the point noted previously,
the United States must recognize that buying time
for threatened regimes through airpower or drones
can only be successful if the time is used well as an
opportunity to raise the warfighting capabilities of
the militaries (especially the ground forces) of the
country under siege and improve the quality of government to give soldiers something for which to fight.
Otherwise, you may be simply postponing the inevitable collapse of a weak and often illegitimate government with a military that cannot defend it. All Middle
Eastern states do not have to evolve into Western-style
democracies, but many need to reduce dysfunctional
levels of corruption and begin to provide some basic
fairness in the political process and the administration of justice. Drone strikes, including “decapitation
strikes” that kill terrorist leaders, can create setbacks
for the organizations challenging weak governments,

76

but new leaders will always be found to replace them.
Drones, by themselves, do not win wars.
7. The United States and its allies may have to accept some limited tacit cooperation with the Assad
regime in Syria in order to destroy or at least weaken
IS in that country. This is not an easy recommendation
to make or to follow. The Assad regime is responsible
for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians
and has conducted warfare against civilians as well
as anti-regime fighters. One of the only virtues that
the Assad regime possesses is that IS is worse. The
Egyptians and more recently the Jordanians seem to
understand this situation. The GCC states may come
to this conclusion eventually since IS is a direct threat
to them and Assad is not. This tacit cooperation could
involve such steps as more coalition efforts to bomb
assembly areas for jihadists preparing to strike regime
strongholds. In the highly unlikely event that Syrian
moderates can be propped up to the point that they
become a serious force in the war, this may allow the
United States and its Arab allies more options. Nevertheless, Syrian moderates (except for Syrian Kurds)
are not a force in that country now, and it is increasingly difficult to generate any reality-based scenario
of how they might come to power. The United States
may, nevertheless, have to continue supporting Syrian
moderate fighters for political reasons to help prove
that the United States is not biased against Sunni Arabs eventually taking power in Syria by ousting the
Alawite-led regime.
8. The United States needs to support a fair and
timely settlement of the crisis in Yemen. A Yemen
in chaos is not in the interests of the United States,
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and the U.S. military needs to be able to return to the
mission of helping the Yemeni military, or at least
their elite forces, deal with threats such as AQAP
and IS, not the Houthis. The Houthi coup, backed by
ex-President Saleh, was unwise and has led to terrible
consequences. Nevertheless, not all Houthi claims are
illegitimate, and giving them a more equitable stake
in the Yemeni future is a good idea. In particular,
Houthis in their home province of Saada should not
be subject to excessive harassment by Salafi missionaries or militias, and they should receive a fair share of
development aid. It is true that the Houthis are receiving aid, including military aid, from the Iranians, but
at the present time they see that as their only option
for a tolerable future in Yemen. A political solution
therefore appears possible. Additionally, if the war in
Yemen continues to drag on, it is imperative for the
United States to continue stressing the need to get humanitarian relief to that country.
9. To the extent possible, the United States should
retain a strong intelligence gathering where friendly
governments may be threatened. This is the form of
support that these regimes most often support. Nevertheless, U.S. military intelligence personnel need to
be aware that some technology and training used for
counterterrorism can also be used for suppressing legitimate dissent. If U.S. support is being misused, this
problem needs to be quickly and clearly conveyed to
senior military leaders who must then pass it on to the
U.S. civilian leadership.
10. The U.S. military leadership must continue to
emphasize a vigorous military exercise program. Organizing the timing, scope, and mix of forces for these
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exercises can be calibrated to meet regional threats
while showing appropriate respect for the equality and sovereignty of U.S. partners in the region.
Eager Lion is clearly a major success and should be
continued.
11. The U.S. Army should continue to emphasize
the value of RAFs. In the face of growing threats,
many partner nations are almost certain to welcome
U.S. support in providing RAFs acting in multilateral
exercises to help improve their military performance
in such skills as air and missile defense, chemical and
biological protection, counterinsurgency operations,
intelligence, and other important aspects of multilateral military cooperation.
12. Military forces (including RAFs) working
with Middle Eastern and Gulf militaries will need
to be properly supported with personnel, material
resources, and funding for the ongoing training with
counterpart militaries. If these units receive fewer resources than units aligned to the Pacific, this will be
noticed by both Gulf allies and potential adversaries.
The U.S. Government emphasis on the Pacific is important but cannot be allowed to seriously weaken
other commands or bring our commitment to key allies into question.
13. The United States must continue to support
missile defense by those nations that feel most
threatened by Iran. This is another central concern to
GCC states and must be treated as a key priority for
both symbolic and military purposes.
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